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INTRAMILITARY TORT LAW: INCIDENCE TO
SERVICE MEETS CONSTITUTIONAL TORT
DONALD ZILLMANt
In this Article Professor Ziliman critically examines the current
state of intramilitary tort law. Professor Zilman traces the historical
development of the prevailing doctrines that govern the ability of the
injured serviceperson to maintain a tort action against the government,
both in this country and in England Through this analysis the Article
explores the emergence of the incident-to-service rule, which bars suits
by militaryplaintiffs when the injury arose out of activity related to mili-
tary service. After examining the competing justifications that counsel
for and against allowing intramilitary tort suits, and considering the ex-
isting statutory compensation system available to the injured service
person, Professor Zillman argues that the incident-to-service rule
should be reconsidered Professor Zillman proposes that the rule be
mod/fed to remove most intramilitary disputesfrom the courts. Where
compensation to the injured serviceperson is not available presently,
Congress should authorize aform of administrative relief
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the significant developments in tort law since World War II has
been the expanded liability of governments aid government officials for
wrongful acts. The law has developed on several fronts. The Federal Tort
Claims Act' and state tort claims statutes have waived federal and state immu-
nity for most negligent and some intentional torts. Federal civil rights statutes,
primarily 42 U.S.C. § 1983, have held state and local officials and local gov-
ernments liable for damages for deprivations of constitutional rights. Federal
officials have been subjected to similar liability stemming from the Supreme
Court decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics.2
Any government tort case raises policy issues not present in a private
party tort suit. Redress for the injured plaintiff may not accord with the public
good. This conflict is sharply illustrated when one party in a case alleging
government wrong is a member of the military. Numerically the uniformed
military constitutes a considerable portion of the federal work force.
3 The
t Professor of Law, University of Utah. Major, Judge Advocate General's Corps, United
States Army Reserve. The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the opinions of any agency of government. Ms. Eva Novak, University of Utah, class of
1981, assisted with the preparation of this Article.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976).
2. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
3. In 1979 there were approximately two million active duty military members. The World
Almanac and Book of Facts, 1982, at 328-31 (1981).
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broad variety of military duties exposes service personnel to almost every form
of tortious or constitutional injury-from injury in automobiles to medical
negligence, from physical abuse to wrongful damage to reputation. Recogni-
tion of the military as a "separate society"4 highlights the different values that
may be involved in litigation over intramilitary misconduct. Not surprisingly,
the claim by a military plaintiff against the government or fellow military
member has proven difficult for courts and legislatures. The tension has be-
come particularly acute in recent years. Revelations of government miscon-
duct in a wide variety of spheres and the growth of new causes of action
against government wrongdoing have encouraged novel suits involving intra-
military claims. At the same time, fears of damage to essential military func-
tions through the treatment of the military as identical to the civilian commu-
nity have led some to urge caution in carrying civilian tort standards over into
the military community.
A focal point for consideration of these issues is Jaffee v. United States.
5
Jaffee, a former Army enlisted man, brought suit on his own behalf and on
behalf of his fellow soldiers against the United States and individual military
and civilian officers. Jaffee alleged that defendants intentionally exposed him
to nuclear radiation during atomic weapons testing in the 1950s. Jaffee, suffer-
ing from inoperable cancer, sought money damages and other relief from the
United States for being compelled to serve as a "nuclear guinea pig."'6 The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed a portion of Jaffee's claim
against the United States7 but allowed the action to continue against the indi-
vidual defendants.8 The case has been reheard en banc. 9 The Jaffee litigation
and other lawsuits alleging major military wrongdoing directed against mili-
tary members10 reflect the need to rethink intramilitary liability. This Article
will attempt that rethinking.
4. See note 166 infra.
5. 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979) (Jaffeel); Jaffee v. United States
(Jaffee II), No. 79-1543 (3d Cir., filed Feb. 20, 1980), vacated, 633 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981).
6. 592 F.2d at 714. Counts I, II and III of Jaffee's complaint joined the United States and
individual government officers as defendants. Money damages were requested. Count IV was a
class action on behalf of all soldiers ordered to be present at the explosion. Only the United States
was named as defendant. The complaint sou.,ht to require the United States to warn all members
of the class of the hazards of their prior radiation exposure and to provide medical care for all
class members. Id.
7. The Third Circuit held that the Government had not waived sovereign immunity over
Jaffee's claims for money damages but had waived immunity over the equitable request for a
warning to class members. 592 F.2d at 719.
8. Jaffee v. United States (Jaffeef1), No. 79-1543 (3d Cir., filed Feb. 20, 1980), vacated, 633
F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981). See Postscript infra.
9. See Postscript infra.
10. E.g., Stanley v. C.I.A., 639 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981) (LSD experiment); Everett v. United
States, 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (exposure to atomic radiation); Schnurman v. United
States, 490 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980) (exposure to mustard gas experiment); Sigler v. LeVan,
485 F. Supp. 185 (D. Md. 1980) (harassment by military security officer); Schmid v. Rumsfeld, 481
F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (failure to provide protection to Marine informant); Nagy v. United
States, 471 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1979) (participation in LSD experiments); Thornwell v. United
States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979) (harassment and participation in LSD experiments). See
also the litigation against manufacturers of the defoliant Agent Orange for damage to troops in
Vietnam. In re Agent Orange Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
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This Article first will examine the historical development of the suit for
tort damages against the government or a government employee for injuries
suffered by a member of the military. The original cases in the English and
American courts arose out of suits against individual military defendants for
intentional torts. These precedents recognized that military needs could be
threatened by such suits but stopped short of providing an absolute prohibi-
tion of them. The passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in 1946
subjected the United States government to a general liability for the negligent
or wrongful acts of its employees. Unfortunately, Congress did not address
the question of whether military plaintiffs were eligible claimants against the
United States. That decision was left to the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts, who imposed a prohibition on most intramilitary suits under the
FTCA. The judicial imprecision of the various decisions created a rule that
was both analytically questionable and difficult to apply in individual cases.
The result has created a wealth of litigation over the last thirty years that al-
most invariably has frustrated plaintiffs, burdened government lawyers and
added little insight into the reasons justifying intramilitary immunities. The
rejection of actions brought against the government has encouraged a return to
actions brought against individual military defendants or actions not relying
on the Federal Tort Claims Act. This tendency has been spurred by the devel-
opment of the constitutional tort action against the federal official. As the
Jaffee litigation indicates, these cases raise some of the most difficult issues in
the intramilitary immunity area.
After investigating the historical background, this Article will examine
various tort claims and their development in the intramilitary context. The
Article will highlight the real policy choices faced in the legislative and judi-
cial resolution of intramilitary tort claims."l In these claims three broad inter-
ests are involved. The first is the individual redress interest. The military
plaintiff alleges loss of life or harm to person, chattels, reputation or career.
Longstanding precepts of Anglo-American tort law hold that these values are
compensable upon a showing that defendant is responsible. The government,
however, may urge that it is entitled to define redress for its military personnel
in its own way. The government may offer some compensatory redress by
statute. The plaintiff may feel that he is entitled to more by judicial remedy.
Beyond monetary compensation the military plaintiff may seek psychological
satisfaction against the wrongdoer. A legal determination may do this by veri-
fying the rightness of plaintiffs position or the wrongfulness of the govern-
ment's conduct. The military plaintiff may feel that redress must be secured
outside the military hierarchy, either from a desire to expose military wrong-
doing or from a fear that the military will not correct its errors. Given the
unique nature of the military society with its vital functions, access to weap-
11. The term "intramilitary suit" is used to include any lawsuit in tort in which (1) plaintiff
alleges harm has occurred during his membership in the armed forces, and (2) the suit is brought
against the government or individual members of the military or both. The terms "serviceman,"
"soldier" and "military member" include members of both sexes of all branches of the armed
services.
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ons, mandatory periods of service, forced duty assignments and emphasis on
control of personnel, the need for avenues of redress can be particularly acute.
The second interest in the intramilitary tort cases is the military efficiency
interest. In the private sector we may allow the individual redress objective to
override a beneficial activity of the defendant. A products liability judgment
may bankrupt a manufacturer. A defamation judgment may close a publisher.
A different rule applies in dealing with a government defendant. At the ex-
treme, tort liability should not prevent an operation of government. More nar-
rowly, tort liability should not impair substantially the necessary workings of
government and government officials. These concerns are particularly strong
when dealing with the military. The military already reflects the choice of
societal values over individual desires. An impairment of military capability
is of the most serious national consequence. Further, the impairment may be
difficult to detect and may not be capable of prompt correction. These factors
urge a careful assessment of assertions that intramilitary torts threaten military
efficiency.
The third interest in the intramilitary tort cases is the interest in citizen
control and review of the military. Intramilitary tort cases can raise crucial
questions about the nature of military activities. The uniformed and civilian
leaders in the Pentagon may not always serve the national interest when they
claim that military efficiency interests preclude individual tort suits. The citi-
zen is entitled to know the values that the military supports. This is so,
whether the citizen is a potential member of the military or merely fearful that
military wrongdoing agaist foreign lands or its own membership can be
turned on the homefront. The tort claim provides one means for addressing
these concerns.
Ideally, the wise solution of an intramilitary claim would satisfy all three
interests, but more often, interests will conflict to some degree. An intelligent
assessment of these interests will allow a more satisfactory solution to the
problems posed by the intramilitary immunity cases.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON-LAW INTRAMILITARY IMMUNITIES
A. The English Precedents
English precedents involving suits by military plaintiffs for wrongs done
by other members of the military were typically suits by subordinate officers
against superiors, brought for intentional conduct. The action was against an
individual defendant, not the government. In theory, English common law
gave the Crown immunity from tort liability for any attempt by a military
member to sue the national government for tortious injury. 12 No similar im-
munity governed the action against the individual wrongdoer. 13 In practice,
12. P. Hogg, Liability of the Crown in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom 62
(1971); J. Jolowic, T. Lewis & D. Harris, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (9th ed. 1971) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Winfield & Jolowicz]; 11 Halsbury's Laws of England 1401 (4th ed. 1976).
13. Winfield & Jolowicz, supra note 12, at 602.
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the distinction between suit against government and suit against an official was
less than absolute. 14 Representatives of the Crown would defend the military
tortfeasor and would settle meritorious cases or pay judgments rendered
against Crown servants.
1 5
Spanning a century and a half, three litigations highlight the British com-
mon-law cases. The cases raise issues still central to contemporary intra-mili-
tary damage suits. The first major decision on the issue of intra-military
immunity is Sutton v. Johnstone,1 6 decided in 1786. Johnstone was the Squad-
ron Commander of a British Naval expedition against the French and Dutch.
Sutton commanded one of the ships in the expedition, which was damaged in
combat. When Johnstone ordered prompt pursuit of the enemy fleet, Sutton
refused to bring his damaged ship into the chase as promptly as Johnstone
wished. Johnstone treated this disobedience of orders as grounds to remove
Sutton from command, to place him under arrest, and considerably later, to
court-martial him. The court-martial held for Sutton and acquitted him of all
charges. Sutton then brought civil action against Johnstone for the arrest, sus-
pension from duty, damage to reputation and malicious prosecution by court-
martial. The case was twice tried to juries, both of which returned verdicts for
Sutton. Johnstone appealed to the Court of Exchequer. He asserted that no
civil action was permissible to redress a dispute involving court-martial prose-
cution for actions taken in the course of military discipline. In essence, this
was the modem claim of absolute immunity. Alternatively, Johnstone argued
that he had probable cause to suspend and court-martial Sutton. The exist-
ence of probable cause would protect Johnstone from suit for damages, re-
gardless of Sutton's acquittal at court-martial. This, in essence, was the
modem claim of qualified immunity.
Writing the opinion for the Court of Exchequer, Baron Eyre rejected both
of Johnstone's contentions. He refused to extend to military commanders the
absolute immunity from tort suits given to judges and jurors. While sug-
gesting that some circumstances would allow the courts to give considerable-
deference to the action of the military superior, Baron Eyre stated that military
conduct could be examined in civil court. He was not persuaded that military
performance would suffer from the possibility of civil litigation: "Men of hon-
our will do their duty and will abide the consequences."' 17 Baron Eyre re-
jected Johnstone's second contention, holding that the acquittal on one of the
court-martial charges reflected the finding that no probable cause existed to
bring the charge.
Commander Johnstone brought a writ of error. He again urged that the
military commander was a public officer similar to a judge. Both were duty-
bound to act for the public good in ways that might injure individual citizens.
14. Jaffee, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L. Rev.
1, 3, 18 (1963).
15. P. Hogg, supra note 12, at 62; Winfield & Jolowicz, supra note 12, at 602; see, e.g.,
Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, L.R. 5 Q.B. 94 (1869); Keighly v. Bell, 176 Eng. Rep. 781 (1866).
16. 99 Eng. Rep. 1215 (1786).
17. Id. at 1222.
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If citizens could freely bring civil suits, the performance of public business
might be damaged. The military context of the case also offered unique justifi-
cations for absolute immunity. Military discipline could be threatened by sub-
ordinates' suits. Further, the specialized nature of the military made it
impossible for a civilian judge or juror to assess accurately a military dispute.
Military proceedings should determine such issues and provide the forum for
punishing a commander's excesses toward a subordinate. Johnstone also re-
newed his contention that he had probable cause for his actions. Sutton's ar-
gument on the absolute immunity issue began with the "general proposition
that whenever any subject of England suffers any damages from any illegal or
injurious act of another. . . the law gives him a remedy by civil action." 18
Sutton cited prior cases that had allowed recovery of civil damages in military
or quasi-military situations.19
On appeal, the Lord Chancellor ruled for Johnstone, basing his judgment
on the views expressed by Lords Mansfield and Loughborough. Their opinion
focused on the "essential ground [for a recovery by Sutton] that a legal prose-
cution was carried on without a probable cause."'20 Their lordships found that
probable cause did exist to bring court-martial charges against Sutton. After
disposing of other matters, the justices then addressed the absolute immunity
issue. They recognized the intramilitary civil suit as a matter of first impres-
sion. In dictum, Lord Mansfield supported absolute immunity. Discipline
could be threatened if "every acquittal before a court-martial" could give rise
to a civil suit. His opinion continued:
The salvation of this country depends upon the discipline of the
fleet; without discipline they would be rabble, dangerous only to
their friends, and harmless to the enemy.
Commanders, in a day of battle, must act upon delicate suspi-
cions; upon the evidence of their own eye; they must give desperate
commands; they must require instantaneous obedience ....
[W]hat condition will a commander be in, if, upon the exercising
of his authority, he is liable to be tried by common-law judicature?2'
At this point, the outspoken defenders of discipline in the fleet returned to
their role as cautious appellate justices. They found "no authority of any kind
either way" on absolute intramilitary immunity. While the question required
resolution "by the highest authority," in this case it was "not necessary to the
judgment."2 2 Later opinions suggest that the full House of Lords did not con-
cur with the Mansfield dictum on absolute immunity.23
18. Id. at 1237.
19. Swinton v. Molloy (1783), discussed in Johnstone v. Sutton, 99 Eng. Rep. 1225, 1239
(K.B. 1783) (false imprisonment action by ship's purser against captain); Wall v. M'Namara
(1779), discussed in Johnstone (false imprisonment by captain in Africa Corps against Lieutenant-
Governor of Senegambia).
20. 99 Eng. Rep. at 1243.
21. Id. at 1246.
22. Id.
23. Warden v. Bailey, 128 Eng. Rep. 253, 256 (1811) (comment of Lawrence, J.).
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Victorian England was the setting for the contribution of the remarkably
litigious Lt. Col. Dawkins to the second of the three English intramilitary
cases. Dawkins was an officer in the Coldstream Guards. Depending upon
whom one believes, Dawkins was either wrongly maligned by fellow officers
or a chronic malcontent. Dawkins' significant problems began when he re-
fused to shake hands with Lord Rokeby, one of his superior officers. Rokeby
ordered him arrested for eleven days. For several years thereafter, Dawkins
sought redress in the military for this and other wrongs. Finally, at Dawkins'
request, a military court of enquiry was called to assess the merits of Dawkins'
charges. In the course of the enquiry proceedings, both Lord Rokeby and
Lord Paulet, another of Dawkins' superiors, expressed their opinions about
Dawkins' unfitness for command. The court of enquiry findings were unfa-
vorable to Dawkins. They noted that his conduct was "marked by a conten-
tious and quarrelsome spirit, much at variance with proper subordination."24
As a consequence, Dawkins was retired from service. His subsequent petitions
to the Queen and Parliament to reopen his case failed. At this point Dawkins
sought the aid of the civil courts.
Dawkins' first action, Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby,2 5 was brought against
Lord Rokeby for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and conspiracy to
remove Dawkins from the Army. Judge Willes, at the Court of Common
Pleas, identified three issues in the case:
1. whether Lord Rokeby acted from bad motives without
probable cause,
2. whether an absolute immunity protected Lord Rokeby's ac-
tions as a witness in the military enquiries, and
3. whether a purely military question could be raised in a civil
tort suit.
Judge Willes focused on the absolute immunity issue. His views strongly
endorsed the dictum of Justice Mansfield in Sutton. Judge Wiles' support for
the absolute immunity mixed a concern for the harm to military discipline
with the necessity for leaving certain matters to military expertise.
I cannot conceive. . . anything more fatal to. . .the discipline or
the subordination of the army-if every officer who considers himself
to have been slighted by his inferiors, or every officer aggrieved by
his superiors ... should seek to undo their judgment before a tribu-
nal which must necessarily have but slight acquaintance with those
matters upon which it is called to pronounce an opinion.
26
Judge Wiles further opined that no evidence supported a finding of malice or
lack of probable cause on Lord Rokeby's part and that civilian principles of
witness immunity would protect many of Rokeby's actions.27 Dawkins was
24. Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, 176 Eng. Rep. 800, 808 (1866).
25. 176 Eng. Rep. 800 (1866).
26. Id. at 815.
27. The judge also dismissed the false arrest charge as barred by the statute of limitations, as
involving military matters, and as probably not justified on the merits. Id. at 813-15.
19821
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nonsuited.
Dawkins brought a further suit against Lord Rokeby for libel and slan-
der.28 This suit focused on Rokeby's comments at the court of enquiry regard-
ing Dawkins' unsuitability for command. Rokeby claimed absolute immunity.
Dawkins maintained he was entitled to recover upon a showing that the de-
famatory statements were made maliciously or lacked probable cause. Chief
Baron Kelly of the Court of Queen's Bench ruled against Dawkins. The Chief
Baron first held that Lord Rokeby was entitled to the absolute immunity ac-
corded to a witness in a civil proceeding. The Chief Baron then offered "an-
other and a higher ground" for its ruling for Lord Rokeby. The Chief Baron
stated that Sutton created a precedent that "a case involving questions of mili-
tary discipline and military duty alone are cognizable only by a military tribu-
nal . . "29 Nonetheless, the holding is less than clear-cut. The court
distinguished other cases ruling for military plaintiffs in civil court challenges
to the exercise of military authority.30 Nor did the opinion detail any particu-
lar threat to military discipline. The House of Lords affirmed but addressed
only the witness immunity issue.31 Although Dawkins had failed again, the
case was far less than a ringing adoption of absolute intramilitary immunity.
Dawkins also sued Lord Paulet. The suit was for defamation involving
comments by Lord Paulet in the course of forwarding Dawkins' complaints to
higher authorities. 32 Lord Paulet claimed an absolute immunity for the report
of a superior military officer on the military capacity and qualifications of a
subordinate. Dawkins contended that he could recover upon a showing of
Lord Paulet's malice. The Court of Queen's Bench ruled for Lord Paulet by a
divided vote. 33 Justice Mellor held that because Lord Paulet was performing a
military duty in forwarding Dawkins' letters with his comments to superior
officers, Paulet was absolutely immune. Alternatively, Justice Mellor relied on
the Sutton dictum to support dismissal of the action. His opinion reflected the
military expertise and the military discipline arguments.34 In Mellor's view, a
military proceeding under the Articles of War had exclusive jurisdiction over
Dawkins' complaint.
Justice Lush concurred that Dawkins' complaint could only be heard by
military tribunals. He viewed the case as involving complaints about
Dawkins' "capacity as a military officer" and not involving his "character...
as a citizen . . . [nor were they intended] for circulation amongst the
28. Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, L.R. 8 Q.B. 255 (1873).
29. Id. at 271.
30. Dickson v. Earl of Wilton, 175 Eng. Rep. 790 (1859); Warden v. Bailey, 128 Eng. Rep.
253, 262 (1811) (remanded for a new trial, with strong urging to drop case, for "they ought only to
be the subject of arrangement among military men").
31. Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, 45 L.J.Q.B (n.s.) 8 (1875).
32. Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, L.R. 5 Q.B. 94 (1869).
33. Justice Hayes died before judgment was rendered. Justice Mellor stated that Justice
Hayes "entirely approved" Justice Mellor's opinion. Id. at 111.
34. "The promotion of an incompetent man may cause the greatest disaster .... " Id. at
115.
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public."3 5
Chief Justice Cockburn dissented. He believed Lord Paulet was entitled
to a qualified privilege but regarded it as "most disastrous" to deny recovery
for the dissemination of a known falsehood, even if done under color of mili-
tary duty. The Chief Justice reviewed the case law from Sutton to Dawkins.
He found the precedents had not adopted absolute immunity. He further op-
posed absolute immunity as a matter of policy. The threat of tort suits did not
deter fearless action by military officers. On the contrary, an absolute immu-
nity for manifest wrongdoing would itself be harmful to military discipline.
36
During World War I the English courts returned a third time to intra-
military litigation in the case of Fraser v. Bafour.37 There, the House of Lords
reviewed a civil suit for false imprisonment and malicious causation of plain-
tiff's retirement from the Navy. The House of Lords dismissed the false im-
prisonment charge because defendant had not participated in the
imprisonment. However, it remanded the malicious exercise of authority
charge for further fact-finding. The opinion of Lord Chancellor Finlay ob-
served that the absolute immunity question was unresolved, noting that
Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby had been affirmed in the House of Lords solely on
witness privilege and not on the broader issue of absolute immunity from civil
court review. The absolute immunity issue was "still open" and involved
"constitutional questions of the utmost gravity."38 The lack of adequate facts
in Fraser's case to decide questions of such gravity compelled the remand.
39
From a contemporary perspective, the English intramilitary tort cases are
surprising because they did not adopt an absolute immunity from civil tort suit
for actions taken in the performance of military duties. Typically, but not
always, the military defendant won the litigation.40 But cases did go to trial,
military command decisions were examined in detail,41 and narrow grounds
for decision were relied upon.42 Cases like Sutton, Dawkins and Fraser posed
direct challenges to the exercise of military authority. The jury in Sutton was
35. Id. at 120.
36. Id. at 108.
37. 87 L.J.K.B. (n.s.) 1116 (1918).
38. Id. at 1118.
39. A subsequent case, Heddon v. Evans, 35 T.L.R. 642, 645 (K.B. 1919), quotes Lord Finlay
in the Fraser case as distinguishing between actions "in excess of, or without, jurisdiction" and
acts "within jurisdiction and in the course of military discipline." Acts in the former category
which amount to "assault, false imprisonment, or other common law wrong, even though the
injury purports to be done in the course of actual military discipline," would be actionable in civil
court damage suits. Actions in the latter category would not be actionable in civil court even if
malice and lack of probable cause were alleged.
40. Among the exceptions are Dickson v. Earl of Wilton, 175 Eng. Rep. 790 (1859); Hanna-
ford v. Huan, 172 Eng. Rep. 68 (1825); Swinton v. Molloy (1783), discussed in Johnstone v. Sut-
ton, 99 Eng. Rep. 1225, 1239 (K.B. 1783); Wall v. M'Namara (1779), discussed in Johnstone.
41. See the lengthy discussions in Heddon v. Evans, 35 T.L.R. 642 (KB. 1919) and Dawkins
v. Lord Rokeby, 176 Eng. Rep. 800 (1866).
42. Fraser v. Balfour, 87 L.J.K.B. (n.s.) 1116 (1918) (no showing of personal culpability of
defendant in false imprisonment charge); Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby, 45 L.J.Q.B. (n.s.) 8 (1875)
(evidence given in military proceedings may not form basis of defamation action); Bailey v. War-
den, 105 Eng. Rep. 882 (1815) (statute of limitations had run and other acts were permissible in
connection with military criminal actions).
1982]
NORTH CAROLINA L4W REVIEW
asked to decide the propriety of combat orders. They had to assess the degree
of damage to Sutton's ship, the necessity for immediate pursuit of the enemy
fleet, and the degree of delay in response to orders. Civilians evaluating
Dawkins or Fraser would have to determine fitness for military command.
The civilian reviewing the Dawkins affair would have to assess the degree of
impropriety in the refusal to shake hands with the commander and other inci-
dents during Dawkins' stormy military career. Justices urging an absolute im-
munity contended first that civilians should not second-guess military
expertise and second that any civil court interference would disrupt military
discipline.
The first argument in favor of deference to the military, that of military
expertise, stresses that the civilian decision regarding the merits of an intra-
military dispute is less likely to be correct than the military's determination.
This is particularly true when the military provides an independent review
process through court of enquiry or court martial. Permitting judgments in
civilian courts to turn on issues of probable cause or malice allows the
wronged party to urge jurors and judges to assess apparently harsh and sum-
mary military acts in civilian terms. Under these conditions, military officers
may not only be subject to the inconvenience of trial but may in fact have
verdicts rendered against them for acts necessary in a military context involv-
ing military expertise.
43
Unlike the arguments regarding expertise, concerns over military disci-
pline do not turn on the rightness or wrongness of military decisions. Civilian
tribunals in some instances may be more accurate fact-finders or more sensi-
tive arbiters of right and wrong than military tribunals. However, the gains
from this accuracy may be overridden by the harm to the control of military
forces arising from the possibility of civilian review. The ability of a
subordinate to challenge a superior's military judgment in the civilian courts
undercuts the system of prompt obedience to orders necessary to run a mili-
tary unit. The English cases all involved disputes going to the heart of the
command relationship. At issue in this discipline argument was the conscious
exercise of the duties of military command, often in wartime or combat
situations.
Other factors also would support an argument to grant absolute immunity
in the early English military. For example, the English military during the age
of empire could be classed far more accurately as a society separate from the
civilian world than could the contemporary American military.44 Further, the
British military of that bygone era relied far more on force and harsh disci-
pline to secure satisfactory military performance than the modern American
military. Yet in spite of these factors, the English judiciary refused to adopt
absolute immunity as an essential protection of discipline. Given this refusal,
43. See cases cited note 40 supra.
44. E. Longford, Wellington-The Years of the Sword 38 (1969), quotes Sir John Fortescue's
comment on the English military recruits of the first half of the 19th century: "They were the off-
scouring of the nation, who could be purchased at a cheap rate by the crimps--criminals, decrepit
old men, raw boys, the half-witted, the feeble minded, even downright lunatics."
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it is ironic to read contemporary United States cases asserting that military
discipline will be harmed irreparably if a soldier can sue a military surgeon for
medical negligence.
45
The reasons for the reluctance of the British courts to adopt absolute im-
munity for intramilitary suits are not well articulated. Several factors are sug-
gested. First, the harshness of military life may have prompted the courts to
entertain claims of abuse of military power. Second, the number of officer
removal cases suggests the importance accorded the officer's commission in a
privilege-conscious society. Finally, as Justice Cockburn suggests in Dawkins,
the absolute immunity may not have been thought needed to secure satisfac-
tory performance of military command. 4 6 A qualified immunity protects the
vigorous commander. A more extensive immunity only protects the tyrant.
When Parliament finally removed the immunity of the national govern-
ment from suits in tort in 1947,47 it is also provided a more substantial intra-
military immunity than the common law cases. Section 10 of the Crown Pro-
ceedings Act frees the service member and the Crown from liability in tort for
"causing the death of another person or for causing personal injury to another
person" when the harmed party is a member of the armed forces on duty at
the time or occupying military premises or property, and when the injured
party is entitled to military pension rights.48 While some torts (e.g., defama-
tion) are not covered by the section, others (e.g., battery, false imprisonment)
are covered to immunize fully the Crown and its service members.
49
B. The American Precedents
The original American decisions in intramilitary cases adopted a quali-
fied immunity in intentional tort cases. Wilson v. Mackenzie,50 decided in
1845, is the most significant state case. A naval officer was sued for beating
and imprisoning an enlisted landsman. The defendant demurred to the com-
plaint, claiming absolute immunity because of military status. The New York
Supreme Court dismissed the demurrer, noting that the English courts had
allowed suits for acts done in the exercise of military discipline.
The next precedent in American intramilitary tort law is the litigation
involving Captain Wilkes and Private Dinsman. Wilkes was the commander
of a naval vessel taking part in a government expedition to the South Seas.
Dinsman was a marine on the ship. During the voyage a dispute arose over
whether Dinsman's enlistment had expired and he was entitled to be shipped
home. Dinsman refused to obey further orders and, at least in Captain
45. E.g., Bailey v. Van Buskirk, 345 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1965) ("The idea is that an undis-
ciplined army is a mob and he who is in it would weaken discipline if he can civilly litigate with
others in the army over the performance of another man's army duty.").
46. Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, L.R. 5 Q.B. 94, 108 (1869).
47. Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 44.
48. Id. § 10.
49. Winfield & Jolowicz, supra note 12, at 604. Adams v. War Office, [1955] 1 W.L.R. 1116,
illustrates the workings of the statutory immunity and the military pension system.
50. 7 Hill 95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1844).
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Wilkes' eyes, threatened to lead a mutiny among the crew. Wilkes arrested
Dinsman, had him flogged and placed in irons and confined him for a few
days in a Hawaiian jail that fell somewhat below contemporary eighth amend-
ment standards. Upon return to the United States, Dinsman initiated court-
martial charges against Captain Wilkes for "cruelty and oppression." Wilkes
was found not guilty. Dinsman then brought civil court action for assault,
battery and false imprisonment. A jury found for Dinsman and awarded him
$500. In 1849 the case reached the United States Supreme Court. 51 Justice
Woodbury agreed that the jury instructions had improperly placed the burden
of proof on Captain Wilkes. In essence, the judge below had not recognized
that Captain Wilkes was entitled to some privilege because of his position:
"Now, in respect to those compulsory duties [of Captain Wilkes],. .. a public
officer, invested with certain discretionary powers, never has been, and never
should be, made answerable for any injury, when acting within the scope of
his authority, and not influenced by malice, corruption, or cruelty."52 Justice
Woodbury emphasized that Captain Wilkes could not claim immunity "for
acts beyond his jurisdiction, or attended by circumstances of excessive sever-
ity, arising from ill-will, a depraved disposition, or vindictive feeling."
53
While the Supreme Court opinion recognized disciplinary concerns, it fell
short of barring any tort action against Captain Wilkes by Private Dinsman.
The case was reversed and remanded for proper jury instructions.
The second jury ruled for Captain Wilkes. The case was returned to the
Supreme Court.54 Again the Court reversed the judgment, this time for evi-
dentiary errors prejudicial to Dinsman. The opinion of the Court still did not
provide an absolute immunity for Captain Wilkes.55 Chief Justice Taney rec-
ognized the danger to discipline from civil damage suits but felt that harm to
the nation would occur if a serviceman could "be oppressed and injured by his
commanding officer, from malice or ill-will, or the wantonness of power."
56
These issues of intent were to be given to the jury. If they found the punish-
ment "was in any manner or in any degree increased or aggravated by malice
or a vindictive feeling . . . or by a disposition to oppress him," Dinsman
should recover.57 The Chief Justice added, in dictum, that had Captain
Wilkes' acts been "forbidden by law, or beyond the power which the law con-
fided to him," he would be liable for even good faith actions.
58
Wilkes indicates that the American courts did not initially adopt Lord
Mansfield's dictum in Sutton. The facts of Wilkes make an appealing case for
absolute immunity. Wilkes' conduct was clearly related to military duty and
51. Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89 (1849).
52. Id. at 129.
53. Id. at 130 (citing Warden v. Bailey, 128 Eng. Rep. 253 (1811)). But see Hannaford v.
Hunn, 172 Eng. Rep. 68 (1825); Bailey v. Warden, 105 Eng. Rep. 882 (1815).
54. Dinsman v. Wilkes, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 390 (1851).
55. Counsel for Captain Wilkes asserted only a qualified immunity. Id. at 400-01.
56. 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 403.
57. Id. at 405.
58. Id. at 404.
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to the completion of a mission of high congressional importance. The facts
suggest the need for severe measures to prevent a mutiny and to save the expe-
dition. A military proceeding had assessed Captain Wilkes' behavior and
deemed it not criminal. The civil proceedings must have taxed the patience of
Captain Wilkes and deflected him from duty. Yet, the Supreme Court twice
allowed the case to proceed to the jury on the basis of a qualified immunity.
The intramilitary suit for negligence did not appear until the twentieth
century.5 9 Several reasons may account for the lack of such suits against indi-
vidual military defendants. First, the negligence action itself was defined only
in the last half of the twentieth century. Motor vehicle accidents and medical
malpractice, two staples of recent intramilitary litigation, developed in the
twentieth century. Second, the negligent tortfeasors were probably fellow en-
listed members or low-ranking officers and likely judgment-proof. Third, the
negligent injuries in the course of military duty did entitle the injured party to
a combination of medical care and disability pension that probably compared
favorably with other disability compensation schemes available at the time.
As governments waived sovereign immunity for the tortious acts of their
officers and employees, intramilitary negligence cases began to appear. The
New York Court of Claims Act 60 and the federal Public Vessels Act 61 pro-
vided opportunities for military personnel to sue the government for the negli-
gent acts of fellow military personnel. Subsequent case law created an intra-
military tort immunity for negligence actions in terms more absolute than the
terms found in British and American intentional tort precedents.6 2 Dobson v.
United States63 and Goldstein v. State64 asserted the immunity doctrine most
strongly. In Dobson the plaintiff's decedent was a submarine officer killed in a
high seas collision allegedly caused by inadequate lighting of the submarine.
An action was brought under the Public Vessels Act, which allowed suit "for
damages caused by a public vessel." The Act was silent about a tort claim
arising out of harm to a military member. The Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit read into the Act a prohibition against military plaintiffs. The
court noted the existence of a compensation program for military personnel
and dependents. The court also stated that a tort suit constituted a "radical
... departure from the government's long-standing policy with respect to the
59. The earliest reported intramilitary tort litigation is Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284
(1616). One soldier shot a fellow member of his command during a training skirmish. The action
was brought in trespass for assault and battery. Plaintiff was given the judgment when defend-
ant's contention of accident was rejected by the court. The court held that in trespass defendant's
lack of wrongful intent was irrelevant except that the accident "be judged utterly without his
fault." The subsequent paragraph states defendant would have been excused if the harm "had
been inevitable, and that the defendant had committed no negligence to give occasion to the hurt."
In modem terms the case would be a negligence action for careless use of firearms. Weaver makes
no mention of any immunity because of the intramilitary nature of the injury.
60. 1920 N.Y. Laws, ch. 922.
61. Ch. 423, 43 Stat. 1112 (1925) (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1976)).
62. Sandoval v. Davis, 288 F. 56 (6th Cir. 1923); Moon v. Hines, 205 Ala. 355, 87 So. 603
(1921); Seidel v. Director General, 149 La. 414, 89 So. 308 (1921); Kennedy v. State, 16 N.Y.S.2d
288 (Ct. Cl. 1939); McAuliffe v. State, 107 Misc. 553, 176 N.Y.S. 679 (1919).
63. 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928).
64. 281 N.Y. 396, 24 N.E.2d 97 (1939).
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personnel of its naval forces." 65
Goldstein involved a suit by a New York National Guardsman against the
state for injury arising from the negligence of a fellow guardsman. The New
York Court of Appeals referred to the prospect of state liability for intramili-
tary negligence as "rather startling."66 A narrow reading of the case indicates
that the court only held that militiamen were not "officers and employees" of
the state for purposes of making the state liable for their torts. More broadly,
the court appeared to endorse Dobson, noting that a pension system existed to
provide recompense for military injuries. The court then observed that allow-
ance of tort suits would "be contrary to the history of military organization
and control."
67
Additional intramilitary negligence cases, prior to the passage of the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, followed the patterns of Dobson and Goldstein: they
consistently rejected tort recovery for negligence, emphasized the existence of
a separate compensation system68 and expressed a belief that the suits would
disrupt military organization and discipline. 69 Cases citing threats to military
organization and discipline were more conclusory than analytical and did not
address British and American intramilitary intentional tort cases with their
allowance of some prospect of tort recovery in matters implicating military
discipline.
III. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND INTRAMILITARY CLAIMS
A4. The Supreme Court Creates the Incident-to-Service Rule
In 1946 Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),7° making
the United States generally liable for negligent or wrongful acts of its employ-
ees committed in the scope of their employment.71 The Act provided an op-
portunity for Congress to clarify the intramilitary tort action immunity
question. Unfortunately, no provision of the Act provides the clarity of sec-
tion 10 of the English Crown Proceedings Act. The legislative history does not
resolve the issue either.72 Now, thirty-five years later, three conclusions can
safely be drawn: (1) the language of the FTCA does not prohibit military
65. 27 F.2d at 808-09.
66. 281 N.Y. at 403, 24 N.E.2d at 100.
67. Id. at 400, 24 N.E.2d at 101.
68. Bradley v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945); O'Neal v. United States, II F.2d
869 (E.D.N.Y. 1925); Moon v. Hines, 205 Ala. 355, 87 So. 603 (1921); Seidel v. Director General,
149 La. 414, 89 So. 308 (1921); McAuliffe v. State, 107 Misc. 553, 176 N.Y.S. 679 (1919).
69. Moon v. Hines, 205 Ala. 355, 87 So. 603 (1921); McAuliffe v. State, 107 Misc. 553, 176
N.Y.S. 679 (1919). See also Wright v. White, 110 P.2d 948, 951-53 (Or. 1941) (action for malicious
prosecution adopts disciplinary harms dictum from Sutton).
70. Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
71. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1976) (administrative adjustment of claims); id. § 1346(b)
(1976) (grant of jurisdiction to federal courts).
72. Among the better studies of the legislative history of the Act and the legislative intent
regarding military plaintiffs are L. Jayson, Handling Federal Tort Claims, ch. 2 (1964); Hitch, The
Federal Tort Claims Act and Military Personnel, 8 Rut. L. Rev. 316, 318-19 (1954); Note, 43 St.
John's L. Rev. 455,456-58 (1969). See also Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706, 711-13 (D.
Md. 1948).
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plaintiffs from bringing suit; (2) plausible arguments can be made from judi-
cial precedent and legislative history to support an implied prohibition of mili-
tary plaintiffs; and (3) in view of frequent discussion of the issue of
intramilitary immunity, congressional inaction since 1950 constitutes tacit ap-
proval of judicial creation of an intramilitary immunity.
Three Supreme Court decisions defined the incident-to-service rule that
bars most suits by military plaintiffs under the FTCA.73 Is is valuable to trace
the progress of these cases through the appellate courts in order to divine the
justifications for a substantial prohibition of intramilitary negligence suits
under the FTCA. The first reported decision was a Maryland federal district
court ruling on a government motion to dismiss an FTCA suit in Jefferson v.
United States.74 Plaintiff was on active duty when injured through the negli-
gence of military doctors. The Government asserted that the military compen-
sation system and the "special relationship" between the United States and its
military personnel prohibited an FTCA suit by a member while on active duty
"due to injuries sustained by the negligence of another member of the
Forces."75 Judge Chesnut was not persuaded by the Government's argument,
denied the motion to dismiss and remanded the case for further argument.
The judge illustrated his concern about the government position by posing the
hypothethical case of the serviceman on furlough injured by government
negligence.
76
Ten months later Judge Chesnut dismissed plaintiffs case in Jefferson.
77
His opinion focused on the existence of a military compensation system and
the peculiar federal relationship of the soldier to the United States.
Three months after the Jefferson dismissal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled on a case involving the facts that had
troubled Judge Chesnut in his hypothetical. The Brooks brothers, military
enlisted men, were hit on a public highway by a truck carrying the Fort Bragg
band. One brother died and one was injured. The brothers had been on fur-
lough at the time of the accident, were driving their own car and were not
engaged in any military business. Both were awarded military administrative
benefits after the accident. Plaintiffs then sought additional compensation
from the United States in an FTCA suit. By a two-to-one vote, the court of
appeals held the Brooks brothers were barred from suit under the FTCA.
78
The majority read the legislative history of the FTCA as indicating that Con-
gress had legislated with knowledge of the Dobson line of cases, which prohib-
ited military members from pursuing statutory tort remedies. 79 Since these
73. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950);
Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949); see Note, 1 Syracuse L. Rev. 87 (1949).
74. 74 F. Supp. 209 (D. Md. 1947).
75. Id. at 210.
76. Id. at 216.
77. Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md. 1948), afl'd, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir.
1949), afl'd, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
78. United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1948), rev'd, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
79. Id. at 845.
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existing precedents disqualified the ritilitary plaintiff, the court believed that
congressional imprecision as to service members argued against permitting the
Brooks' case. The majority noted the brothers had received statutory benefits
and suggested that tort suits might cause a "subversion of military disci-
pline." 80 The majority denied FTCA recovery even though the injuries were
not "service-caused." Judge Parker, in dissent, read the statute and legislative
history as allowing a suit arising out of "injuries [not] connected with the mili-
tary service of plaintiffs.
81
The Brooks plaintiffs took their case to the Supreme Court. 82 They ar-
gued broadly that the FTCA did not disqualify military plaintiffs and nar-
rowly that an "injury wholly unconnected with military affairs and not arising
out of any armed service status or relationship" should be compensable in
tort.8 3 Government argument focused on the comprehensive compensation
system, which implied that military injuries were to be redressed outside of the
tort process.
84
The Court ruled for the plaintiffs. Justice Murphy for the majority
adopted plaintiffs' view of the statutory language, holding that the FTCA al-
lowance of "any claim"8 5 provided no exclusion for military plaintiffs. He
found that the legislative history of the FTCA also reflected a congressional
judgment not to exclude soldiers. Further, the existing military compensation
system was not made an exclusive remedy nor had Congress dictated an elec-
tion of remedies. However, the opinion suggested the Government could not
be required to pay twice--once through administrative compensation and
once in the FTCA action-for the same injury. The Government should re-
ceive credit for any military compensation payments in determining an FTCA
award.
86
This portion of the Court's opinion was a reasonable exercise in statutory
construction. However, the opinion also chose to address the consequences of
tort liability on the functioning of the military. The Court rejected the Gov-
ernment's fear of "dire consequences" should a "battle commander's poor
judgment, an army surgeon's slip of hand, [or] a defective jeep" make the
United States liable in tort. The Brooks' accident "had nothing to do with
[their] army careers."' 87 Had the accident been "incident to the Brooks' serv-
ice, a wholly different case would be presented."
88
Brooks is unpersuasive in its explanation of a legislative intent to prohibit
80. Id.
81. Id. at 850 (Parker, J., dissenting).
82. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
83. Brief in Support of Petition for Writs of Certiorari at 16, Brooks v. United States, 337
U.S. 49 (1949).
84. Brief for Defendant at 18-30, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
85. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2672, 1346(b) (1976) ("civil actions on claims").
86. 337 U.S. at 53-54.
87. Id. at 52.
88. Id.
[Vol. 60
INTRAMILITR Y TORT LAW
soldier FTCA suits in some circumstances and allow them in others.8 9 The
Court tried to make policy when Congress had not done so. Unfortunately,
the policy it made was poorly considered. The Brooks Court did not suggest
why suits against the United States by military plaintiffs are undesirable.
Also, the discussion of types of military lawsuits did not distinguish the dan-
gers of these suits brought against the military by civilian plaintiffs and the
dangers of those brought by military plaintiffs. Yet negligence cases for medi-
cal malpractice and improper maintenance of a government vehicle were fa-
miliar to courts in 1946. Surely the Court did not imply that the FTCA would
bar a civilian from suing the military for these injuries. By contrast, suit for a
battle commander's poor judgment does raise novel issues whether brought by
a civilian or a military member. This action would certainly involve funda-
mental military decisions. It would also be prohibited by statutory exceptions
to tort liability contained in the FTCA.90
The second failing of the Brooks opinion is its treatment of the military
compensation system. The system had been authorized by various statutes
and carried out by administrative rules long before passage of the FTCA.91
Compensation eligibility is based on military status and lack of serious mis-
conduct at the time of injury or death. The system is one of government paid
protection for the serviceperson and his or her dependents that applies if the
serviceperson was on active duty and the injury is not incurred or contracted
during a period of unauthorized absence and is not due to the "intentional
misconduct or willful neglect of the member." 92 Further, the serviceman ben-
efits from a presumption that he was in the line of duty and the injury was not
due to his misconduct.93 The Government must supply substantial evidence
to rebut the presumption. The compensation program combines elements of
workers' compensation protection, health and disability protection, and life
insurance to protect the serviceman on or off the job. Thus, the Brooks broth-
ers were eligible for benefits even though they were on vacation and engaged
in no work-related duties. They would have been compensated even if they
89. Id. at 53.
90. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2680(a), (h), (j), (k) (1976) ("discretionary function" exception; claims
arising out of assault, battery, misrepresentations; combatant activity claim; claim arising in a
foreign country). The notable illustration of the difficulties in such a suit is Rotko v. Abrams, 338
F. Supp. 46 (D. Conn. 1971) (FTCA suit for Vietnam combat death).
91. Various provisions of statutes provide for the serviceman harmed in the line of duty. See
31 U.S.C. § 241 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (Military Personnel and Civilian Employees Claims Act
of 1964 authorizing payment for loss or damage of personal property); 10 id. § 1074 (1976) (enti-
tlement to medical and dental care); id. §§ 1076-1079 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (dependents' entitle-
ment to medical care); id. §§ 1201-1204 (retirement because of physical disability); id. § 1212
(1976) (disability severance pay); id. § 1447 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (survivor benefits plan); id.
§§ 1475-1478 (1976) (death gratuity); id. §§ 1481-1484 (burial provisions); 38 id. §§ 310-314 (veter-
ans disability benefits in wartime); id. §§ 331-335 (veterans' disability benefits in peacetime); id.
§§ 410-411 (dependents' compensation for service-connected deaths); id. § 610 (VA hospital and
nursing home care); id. §§ 765-767 (Servicemen's Group Life Insurance program). The military
disability benefits system is summarized in Dep't of the Army, Pam. No. 27-21, Military Adminis-
trative Law Handbook §§ 29-30 (1973); Hitch, supra note 72, at 326-28; Note, 29 Hastings L.J.
1217, 1226-30 (1978); Note, 45 N.C.L. Rev. 1129, 1138-39 (1967).
92. Dep't of the Army, supra note 91, § 3.26a.
93. Id.
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had been negligent and caused the accident. Justice Murphy's "incident-to-
service" test for FTCA purposes creates a different eligibility test. The result
of Brooks was the creation of a system that allows unpredictable payments
from the United States to negligently injured servicemen.
The "wholly different case" envisioned in Brooks was not long in reach-
ig the Supreme Court. In fact, three cases were decided by federal courts of
appeal shortly after Brooks. In Feres v. United States94 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of a suit alleging government negli-
gence in a barracks fire that killed plaintiff's decedent. The opinion stressed
the existence of the military compensation system and endorsed Dobson.
Brooks was distinguished as a case "where military personnel were not on
active duty."' 95 In Griggs v. United States96 a divided Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit reversed a dismissal of a medical malpractice complaint. The
court expanded Brooks to make eligible under the FTCA a plaintiff "on ac-
tive, but not combat, duty."' 97 The third and last decision was the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals' review of Jefferson v. United States.9" By the time of
decision, the court had the benefit of not just the Supreme Court opinion in
Brooks, but also the previous month's decisions in Feres and Griggs. A unani-
mous court (including Judge Parker, the dissenter in Brooks) affirmed Judge
Chesnut's rejection of the serviceman's medical malpractice suit. The court
based its opinion on "the peculiar relationship that exists between a member
of the armed services and superior military authority."99 Congress did not
intend to subject conduct causing injuries to servicemen "in the execution of
military orders" to review in a civil negligence suit. "If this were so, the civil
courts would be required to pass upon the propriety of military decisions and
actions and essential military discipline would be impaired by subjecting the
command to the public criticism and rebuke. .... 100 The court "fortified"
its conclusion by reference to the distinctly federal relationship between sol-
dier and government and the existing compensation system. 1° 1 The opinion
provides the first adoption of fear of disruption of military discipline as a ra-
tionale for rejecting servicemen's tort suits.102
The three cases were consolidated for decision in the Supreme Court. A
unanimous Court ruled against all three plaintiffs.' ° 3 It held that the United
States was not liable under the FTCA "for injuries to servicemen where the
injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service." 1 4
Justice Jackson began the Court's opinion by conceding that the legisla-
94. 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949).
95. Id. at 537.
96. 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949).
97. Id. at 2.
98. 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949).
99. Id. at 519-20.
100. Id. at 520.
101. Id. (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305-06 (1947)).
102. Id.
103. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurred in the result).
104. Id. at 146.
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tive purpose was not clear. He then sought to construe the FTCA "to fit, so far
as will comport with its words, into the entire statutory system of remedies
against the Government." 105 Several reasons were suggested why the FTCA
was not meant to apply to the claims of military plaintiffs injured incident to
their service. First, a major congressional objective in passing the FTCA had
been to free Congress of the burden of considering private bills for tortious
injuries by government employees. Very few of these bills were for military
members. Second, the Act makes the United States "liable. . . in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual."' 1 6 No private indi-
vidual's liability is "remotely analogous" to that asserted against the United
States. In particular, no American decision had allowed a serviceman to sue
his superiors or the government for negligence.10 7 Third, since recovery under
the FTCA is determined under "the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred,"' 08 it would "hardly be a rational plan of providing for those dis-
abled in service by others in service"'109 to require a soldier to rely on the tort
rules of the state into which he was ordered. Further, the soldier is at a disad-
vantage in litigation because of his duty status. Fourth, the soldier-govern-
ment relation is distinctly federal. A highly ordered compensation system
exists not requiring litigation and providing remedies that "compare extremely
favorably" with state workers' compensation formulas. All of these factors
supported the rejection of the military plaintiff.
It remained for the Court to deal with Brooks. Rather summarily the
Court pointed to the "vital distinction" that the Brooks' injuries did not "arise
out of. . . military duty." Their "relationship while on leave was not analo-
gous to that of a soldier injured while performing duties under orders." 110
The Feres opinion is a more careful study of the legislative history of the
FTCA and the policy choices in the intramilitary cases than that provided in
Brooks. Nonetheless, it fails as an attempt to assess the status of the military
plaintiff under the FTCA. First, the opinion adopts the imprecise incident-to-
service terminology without providing further explanation of its meaning.
The term evidently meant something more than the workers' compensation
"performance of duty" standard"' and something less than the traditional
105. Id. at 139.
106. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
107. 340 U.S. at 141. Justice Jackson cites no case, statute or other authority for this proposi-
tion. His footnote reads "Cf. Dinsman v. Wilkes, 12 How. 390 and Weaver v. Ward, Hobart 135,
Eng. Rep. 284 (1616) as to intentional torts." 340 U.S. at 141 n.10. Given Weaver's essential
posture as a negligence case (see note 59 supra) and Dinsman's endorsement of a tort suit under
circumstances ar more injurious to military command and the special soldier-government rela-
tionship than the Feres case, the conclusion seems lightly supported at best.
108. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2672 (1976).
109. 340 U.S. at 143.
110. Id. at 146.
111. The Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8151, 8171-8173, 8191-
8193 (1976 & Supp. I 1979), is the federal compensation program for most civilian civil servants.
Section 8116(c) makes its recovery the exclusive remedy against the government. See Johansen v.
United States, 343 U.S. 427 (1952) and Patterson v. United States, 359 U.S. 495 (1959) on the
exclusivity issue. The FECA compensates for death or injury "in the performance of. . . duty.'
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military "line of duty" determination.' 12 Second, several of the Feres prem-
ises were doubtful. The necessity of finding an identical private liability has
been rejected by later Court decisions. 113 The concern over the irrationality of
allowing fifty state laws to govern military plaintiffs' recoveries applies to a
Brooks situation as well as a Feres situation. Further, when the alternative is
denying an FTCA remedy altogether, worries about the burden of tort suits on
soldiers seems hypocritical. Third, the distinction between Feres and Brooks
is unpersuasive. As just noted, servicemen in either situation face the same
problems in struggling with different jurisdictions. Both are in a federal status
as soldiers on active duty. Both are entitled to the compensation system bene-
fits. Both could be asserting novel theories of liability. Fourth, the discussion
in the opinion of intramilitary suits at common law is limited to a sentence and
a footnote that briefly suggest long-established precedents barring intramili-
tary tort suits. Finally, the opinion does not address the disruption of disci-
pline issue raised by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Jefferson and
earlier alluded to in Brooks. Surely this is a concern in the intramilitary tort
case. Do these concerns present themselves in the facts of medical malpractice
or barracks maintenance negligence? How should this element be assessed in
measuring subsequent incident-to-service questions? The Court gave no
answer.
The last case in the incident-to-service trilogy was United States v.
Brown,' 14 decided in 1954. Plaintiff was a military veteran originally injured
on active duty. Seven years after receiving his honorable discharge, he was at
a Veterans Administration hospital and suffered from the doctor's malpractice.
The only negligence alleged in his FTCA suit occurred during the post-dis-
charge VA hospital treatment. The Government argued Feres controlled since
the original injury arose out of Brown's military service and because the Vet-
erans Administration compensation system provided federal relief to veterans
injured at a VA facility. Brown argued that Brooks controlled. Brooks made
clear that a military compensation scheme was not the exclusive remedy.
Brown maintained that other Feres factors did not apply to a person with no
active duty relationship to the military at the time of the injury. In particular,
Brown's counsel asserted that one justification for Feres was the fear of disrup-
tion of military discipline from intramilitary suits.
5 U.S.C. § 8102(a) (1976). Joyce v. United States, 474 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1973), considers when the
performance of duty begins.
112. See Dep't of the Army, supra note 91, § 3.26. The Federal Tort Claims Act unfortunately
defines scope of employment for military members in line-of-duty terms. Scope of employment
determines whether the United States will be liable for its employees' torts. Military line-of-duty
determinations assess whether military members who have been harmed are entitled to various
benefits. As the Brooks litigation suggests, the two standards are not the same. The vacationing
Brooks brothers were eligible for benefits. Had they been negligent, the United States would not
have treated them as within the "scope of employment" for purposes of subjecting the United
States to FTCA liability. The cases have limited "scope of employment" for military tortfeasors
to the standards of master and servant cases. See L. Jayson, supra note 72, § 204.
113. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957); Indian Towing Co. v. United States,
350 U.S. 61 (1955).
114. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
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The Supreme Court sided with Brown by a divided vote, holding that
Brown's injury was not incident to military service. Brown, like the plaintiffs
in Brooks, could bring suit under the FTCA, although any recovery would
have to reflect benefits already given by the administrative compensation
scheme.11
5
Justice Douglas' interpretation of Feres for the Brown majority is signifi-
cant; pointing at the "peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his
superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the
extreme results that might obtain of suits. . . were allowed for negligent or-
ders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty,"' 16 Jus-
tice Douglas read a great deal into the Feres holding. The Feres opinion
mentioned the special relationship of soldier to government, but did so in the
context of the military compensation system rather than any disciplinary
threat. The other disciplinary horribles were not mentioned in Feres by the
Supreme Court even though that Court was aware of similar language in the
court of appeals' decision in Jefferson. Further, Douglas' opinion ignored the
precedents of the Wilkes litigation, a case far more relevant on its facts to
disciplinary harm from intramilitary tort suits than either Feres or Brown.
Since 1954, the Court has shown considerable reluctance to re-enter the
incident-to-service quagmire. In its only two re-examinations of Feres,- the
Court has readopted the Douglas explanation of Feres and has not changed
the holdings of the Brooks-Feres-Brown trilogy.
The first of these re-examinations, United States v. Muniz,1 7 authorized
FTCA suits by certain federal prisoners. The Court's unanimous opinion as-
sessed Feres as a relevant but not controlling precedent. The opinion provided
a more accurate summary of the original Feres rationale than did Brown but
then undercut many of the original Feres justifications. The Court found
Feres best justified by the disciplinary language of Brown." 8
Despite the statement that the Muniz Court had "no occasion to question
Feres,"119 both the analysis of Feres and the holding in Muniz encouraged a
belief that the Court intended to back away from the incident-to-service rule
and allow more military plaintiffs access to the FTCA. Numerous cases in the
lower federal courts were argued on the theory that the incident-to-service rule
had been changed to the benefit of military plaintiffs.' 20 Unfortunately for
plaintiffs, the lower courts were unresponsive.
By the time the Supreme Court next considered the incident-to-service
rule, most of the Muniz justices had left the Court. In 1977 the Court strongly
reaffirmed Feres in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States.121 Cap-
115. Id. at 115.
116. Id. at 112.
117. 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
118. Id. at 162.
119. Id. at 159.
120. See, e.g., Buckingham v. United States, 394 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1968); Sheppard v. United
States, 369 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1966).
121. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
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tain Donham, an Air National Guard pilot, had been injured severely when
the exit system of his plane malfunctioned. Donham had been given military
medical and pension benefits. 122 He sued the United States and Stencel, the
manufacturer of the allegedly defective part. Stencel, claiming the primary
negligence had been that of the United States, cross-claimed for indemnity.
The United States, relying on the incident-to-service rule, secured dismissals
of both Donham's and Stencel's complaints.' 23 The case reached the Supreme
Court on the issue of Stencel's right to indemnity from the United States.
While the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Yellow Cab Co. 124 had
validated indemnity actions against the United States under the FTCA, that
case had not involved an injury to an ineligible plaintiff. The Stencel Court, in
a seven-to-two decision, reaffirmed Feres. The opinion recognized that the
disciplinary harm language had been incorporated in Brown.125 Nonetheless,
it found that reason persuasive in barring an indemnity action when the party
was originally injured incident to service. Allowance of the Stencel suit
against the United States could involve "second-guessing military orders, and
would often require members of the Armed Services to testify in court as to
each other's decisions and actions."' 126 Also persuasive to the Court was the
fact that allowance of the Stencel action would undercut the military compen-
sation scheme.
Stencel reaffirmed the Court's support for the incident-to-service rule in
ringing tones. This was significant in view of the general improvement in the
position of tort claimants against government and government officials be-
tween 1954 and 1977. It was also significant in view of the wealth of incident-
to-service litigation in the lower federal courts since the Brown decision. If the
Supreme Court was dissatisfied with particular aspects of that litigation it did
not suggest that fact in Stencel.
B. Defining the Contours of Incidence to Service
The Supreme Court's lack of clarity in defining incidence to service cre-
ated ample business for lower federal courts and government administrative
claim officers. 127 Other writings have detailed the perceived shifts of meaning
as district and circuit courts decided individual "incident-to-service" cases.128
A reading of all reported lower court incident-to-service decisions over the last
122. Donham received a lifetime pension of approximately $1500 per month. Id. at 668.
123. The district court dismissed Donham's action against the United States on the authority
of Feres. Donham did not pursue the issue to the court of appeals. Donham v. United States, 536
F.2d 765, 767 n.1 (8th Cir. 1976).
124. 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
125. 431 U.S. at 671-72.
126. Id. at 673. The Court's reasoning is criticized in Note, 29 Hastings L.J. 1217 (1978); Note,
77 Mich. L. Rev. 1099 (1979).
127. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1976) requires presentation of a tort claim to the responsible federal
agency prior to bringing suit on the claim in federal district court. The administrative process
settles the great majority of all FTCA claims against the government.
128. Jacoby, The Feres Doctrine, 24 Hastings L.J. 1281 (1973); Rhodes, The Feres Doctrine
After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F. JAG L. Rev. 24 (1976); Note, 45 N.C.L. Rev. 1129 (1967); Note,
43 St. John's L. Rev. 455 (1969).
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quarter century reveals several facts. 129 First, the incidence-to-service issue
has continued to be litigated. Research discovered 147 reported cases involv-
ing the doctrine in the intramilitary context. A significant number of these
cases were decided post-Stencel. Second, plaintiffs have been remarkably un-
successful. Of the 147 cases, excluding cases clearly within the Brooks or
Brown fact patterns, plaintiffs won only eight cases.' 30 Several of these eight
decisions are district court opinions that may be reversed on appeal. In these
and other cases, plaintiffs still must win their cases on the merits. The lower
courts have been virtually unanimous in rejecting any serviceman's claim
under the FTCA that is not squarely controlled by Brooks
13 1 or Brown.' 32
Plaintiffs have tried and have failed to distinguish Feres on the grounds that a
nonmilitary tortfeasor was involved, 133 that the plaintiff was a Reserve or Na-
tional Guard member,' 34 that an intentional 135 or constitutionally based
tort 136 was involved, that only personal property damage was involved, 137 that
129. All decisions were examined from January 1, 1955, until Vol. 654 of the Federal Reporter
and Vol. 517 of the Federal Supplement, in cases keynoted (in the West Digest system) United
States, § 78(16), Armed Services Personnel, injuries to. Decisions containing a factual pattern
indicating suit on behalf of a military plaintiff against the United States or another government
employee were included. Also included were several cases assessing the Feres doctrine in related
contexts. Lastly, several other incident-to-service cases not included in the keynumber system
were included. The result should provide a comprehensive study of the federal trial and appellate
court assessment of incident-to-service cases after the Supreme Court decisions in Brooks, Feres
and Brown had clarified the contours of the rule. A summary of all cases studied appears at
Appendix infra.
130. Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (incident-to-service rule does not
bar military plaintiff's action under Swine Flu statute, which made United States liable for claims
against flu vaccine manufacturers); Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1980) (injury
on military road); Mills v. Tucker, 499 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1974) (injury on road abutting military
installation); Stephen v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 323 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (injury at voluntary
military recreational activity away from normal duty station); Bryson v. United States, 463 F.
Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (off-duty fatality in trying to control drunk on military installation);
Hand v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 38 (M.D. Ga. 1966) (injury on highway included in military
base); Downes v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 626 (E.D.N.C. 1965) (accident on military installa-
tion while plaintiff on pass but in uniform); Rich v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa.
1956) (on leave but driving to post). See also Troglia v. United States, 602 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir.
1979) (remand); Henderson v. Bluemink, 511 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (remand); Bankston v.
United States, 480 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1973) (remand); Nowotny v. Turner, 203 F. Supp. 802
(M.D.N.C. 1962); Armiger Estates v. United States, 339 F.2d 625 (Ct. CI. 1964) (equitable claim
allowed despite Feres bar).
131. The following cases were controlled by Brooks: Knecht v. United States, 242 F.2d 929
(3d Cir. 1957); In re United States, 303 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D.N.C. 1969); Sapp v. United States, 153
F. Supp. 496 (W.D. La. 1957).
132. Brown controlled in the following cases: Milliken v. United States, 439 F. Supp. 290 (D.
Kan. 1976) (Army prisoner after discharge); Watt v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 386 (E.D.N.Y.
1965) (retired military man); Hungerford v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1961)
(dishonorably discharged veteran).
133. Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975); Layne v. United States, 295 F.2d 433
(7th Cir. 1961).
134. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977); United States v. Carroll,
369 F.2d 618 (8th Cir. 1966); Knoch v. United States, 316 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1963); Herremen v.
United States, 332 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Wis. 1971), afl'd, 476 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1973).
135. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. United States, 594 F.2d 1154 (7th Cir. 1979); Schnurman v. United
States, 490 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980); Sigler v. LeVan, 485 F. Supp. 185 (D. Md. 1980); Schmid
v. Rumsfeld, 481 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Stupp. 344
(D.D.C. 1979).
136. Everett v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980); Schnurman v. United States,
490 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980); Sigler v. LeVan, 485 F. Supp. 185 (D. Md. 1980); Schmid v.
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plaintiffhad never been validly admitted to the military,138 and that the claim-
ant had an independent claim for the harm.139 The courts have felt free to
pick and choose among the rationales of the Feres decision, almost always
choosing a rationale for denying recovery.140 The message for plaintiff's coun-
sel is blunt: unless your military plaintiff was not performing military duties,
not on a military installation, not subject to any immediate military command
relationship, and not taking advantage of any special military privileges at the
time of the negligent or wrongful government act, don't take the case!
The incident-to-service doctrine has been criticized by the legal commen-
tators14 1 and some courts. 142 Much of the criticism is justified. The Congress
left a significant issue unclear in the 1946 Act. The Supreme Court then cre-
ated an ill-explained rule that the lower courts have struggled to rationalize.
The Supreme Court itself has shifted its justification for the rule. Increased
use of the disciplinary harm justification has been particularly unfortunate.
The facts of the decided cases rarely support a contention that an FTCA suit
would harm military discipline in any immediate way. The Supreme Court's
dicta picture a constant stream of injured subordinates suing their com-
manders for the exercise of military authority. The perceived result is loss of
command authority and the promotion of discord in the ranks. The 147 re-
ported incident-to-service cases hardly bear this out.143 Forty-seven of the
cases are medical negligence cases; forty-one involve vehicle or plane acci-
dents; eleven involve government property maintenance failures; eight arise
out of injuries at military recreational areas; eight challenge a wrongful entry
into the military or a failure to discharge once admitted (most are further spe-
cies of medical negligence); and ten involve military police or correction of-
ficer torts. Only eleven cases arise out of what appear to be injuries incurred
in the performance of the serviceperson's work duties. Only in the last in-
Rumsfeld, 481 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Nagy v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C.
1979); Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979); Misko v. United States, 453 F.
Supp. 513 (D.D.C. 1978), afld, 593 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
137. United States v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 238 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1956); Preferred Ins.
Co. v. United States, 222 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1955); Rivera-Grau v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 394
(D.N.M. 1971).
138. Yolken v. United States, 590 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1979); Joseph v. United States, 505 F.2d
525 (7th Cir. 1974); Gerardi v. United States, 408 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1969); Thompson v. United
States, 493 F. Supp. 28 (W.D. Okla. 1980); Becton v. United States, 489 F. Supp. 134 (D. Mass.
1980); Calhoun v. United States, 475 F. Supp. I (S.D. Cal. 1977), afl'd, 604 F.2d 647 (9th Cir.
1979); Jackson v. United States, 451 F.2d 282 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
139. DeFont v. United States, 453 F.2d 1239 (1st Cir. 1972); Harrison v. United States, 479 F.
Supp. 529 (D. Conn. 1979); Van Sickel v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 791 (S.D. Cal. 1959), afrd,
285 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1960).
140. Among the notable cases finding incidence to service, and ineligibility for plaintiff status
under the FTCA, are Charland v. United States, 615 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1980); Veillette v. United
States, 615 F.2d*505 (9th Cir. 1980); Woodside v. United States, 606 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1979);
Stansberry v. Middendorf, 567 F.2d 617 (4th Cir. 1978); Camassar v. United States, 531 F.2d 1149
(2d Cir. 1976).
141. E.g., Jacoby, supra note 128; Rhodes, supra note 128; Note, 12 Conn. L. Rev. 492 (1980);
Note, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1099 (1979); Note, 43 St. John's L. Rev. 455 (1969).
142. Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1973); Henninger v. United States, 473
F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973); James v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 1381 (D.R.I. 1973).
143. See cases cited at Appendix infra.
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stances are normal command relationships likely to be involved and command
decisions challenged. Quite probably, the incident-to-service cases, as unclear
as they may be, emphasize that these performance-of-duties cases are hopeless
for plaintiffs. However, it is unfortunate to justify all incident-to-service cases
on disciplinary grounds. It is unfair to the military plaintiff to offer specious
reasons to deny his suit. The sailor subjected to malpractice at an outproces-
sing physical 144 or the soldier harmed at a poorly maintained military recrea-
tion area 145 cannot help but feel contempt for the military and the law when
his suit is denied because of a "threat to discipline." The cases are also unfair
to the military in suggesting that "harm to military discipline" is really a
makeweight argument when the government can find no better reason for de-
nying an FTCA claim. The federal courts have had to face serious legal issues
involving military discipline in the past decade in nontort contexts. 14 6 The
incident-to-service precedents have proven of little analytical help in resolving
these cases.
Most critics' solutions to the absurdities of the incident-to-service doctrine
have been to liberalize servicemen's eligibility under the FTCA. 147 Better
analysis of the area, however, suggests that it was not Feres that was wrongly
decided, but Brooks. Aside from trying to interpret what the limited legisla-
tive history implies in Congress' original failure to discuss military plaintiffs in
the FTCA, sound policy would suggest adoption of an absolute bar to FTCA
suits for death or injuries received by an active duty serviceperson who was
eligible for military benefits at the time of suit.' 48 The change could be made
by Congress in language similar to section 10 of the British Crown Proceed-
ings Act. It could also be made by the Supreme Court by an overruling of
Brooks.
C. A Justfcation of a Bar to Military Plaintiffs
Analysis of the incident-to-service cases suggests the courts are reaching
satisfactory results for unsatisfactory reasons. A prohibition on military
claimants under the FTCA is not the illogical rule seen by critics of the inci-
dent-to-service cases. Rather, a broad prohibition on military plaintiffs is sup-
ported by the existing military administrative compensation program and the
unique needs of government in defining the relationship between soldiers and
144. E.g., Henninger v. United States, 473 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973).
145. E.g., Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975).
146. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Relford v.
Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971) (extent of court-martial jurisdiction); Carlson v. Schlesinger,
511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Dash v. Commanding General, 307 F. Supp. 849 (D.S.C. 1969),
afld, 429 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1970).
147. Hitch, supra note 72; Rhodes, supra note 128, at 43 (allow FTCA action for harm outside
normal duty assignment); Note, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1099, 1121-26 (1979) (limit Feres to cases involv-
ing a government exercise of discretion); Note, 43 St. John's L. Rev. 455, 475-76 (1969) (Fetes
should bar recovery only for "peculiarly military aspects"); Note, 14 Val. L. Rev. 527 (1980) (limit
Fetes to performance of military duty injuries).
148. See Note, 45 N.C.L. Rev. 1129 (1967), suggesting this resolution to Feres.
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government. The court decisions have hinted at aspects of these values but
have not carefully defined them.
The presence of the first main value, the existing compensation system, is
essential. The Feres decision and the subsequent lower court decisions about
the meaning of "incidence to service" would be shocking if the only compen-
sation for the service person killed or injured by government negligence was
under the FTCA. The military administrative benefits system' 49 must be
weighed from the serviceperson's viewpoint and from the government's.
While the system is not perfect, it is certainly a constitutionally rational re-
sponse by Congress to the broad problem of harm to a special kind of federal
employee, the uniformed military member. Even if the government has
"taken away" a serviceperson's "rights" under the FTCA,' 50 the military com-
pensation scheme provides a "reasonably just substitute" for the tort remedy it
displaces.151 Constitutional questions aside, the prohibition of FTCA reme-
dies in addition to compensation remedies is a matter of sound policy. Objec-
tions to the inadequacy of the military compensation must be measured in
terms of the protection given the serviceperson from injury or disease under
any circumstances while on active duty, not just in situations in which the
serviceman would have an FTCA action against the United States if he or she
were a civilian. 152 Judged by this measure, the military compensation system
provides a very broad insurance against the risks of day-to-day living, not just
the hazards of the military workplace. The system reflects the view of the
military person serving twenty-four hours per day, 365 days per year. The
compensation system must also be evaluated with the military retirement sys-
tem that allows pension payments to begin with as little as twenty years of
service. Two points should be made. First, the compensation system gives
significant benefits to the serviceman not available to civilians or other govern-
ment employees. Second, the compensation system is part of the entire con-
gressionally fine-tuned military pay-and-benefits system. It should also be
remembered that the FTCA is statutorily limited to discourage large verdicts.
The Act's prohibition of jury trials, 153 punitive damages, 154 prejudgment in-
terest 155 and excessive attorney's fees156 and its requirement of attempts at
149. See note 91 supra.
150. The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976), created the right of action
in tort against the United States. No common-law right to sue the United States was changed by
the Act.
151. See the discussion of constitutional requirements for a statutory scheme abrogating com-
mon law rights in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 87-88 (1978).
The Court indicated that there the statutory scheme would provide a "reasonably just substitute
for the common-law or state tort law remedies it replaces." Id. at 88. The Court did not decide
whether even that standard of protection was constitutionally mandated.
152. Several of the critical commentators take this approach. They assume the military bene-
fits system as a given and then criticize its inadequacy when a serviceman could also be eligible for
FTCA recovery. See Rhodes, supra note 128, at 41; Note, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1099, 1107-09 (1979).
153. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976).
154. Id. § 2674.
155. Id.
156. Id. § 2678.
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administrative settlement 57 do not make the FTCA the happy hunting
ground of the plaintiffs personal injury lawyer. Million-dollar judgments
have been awarded under the Act,' 58 but they are the decided exception.
From the serviceman's point of view the administrative compensation system
provides a considerable degree of individual redress. It is hardly a poor sec-
ond choice to the FTCA remedy.
The prohibition of intramilitary negligence suits under the FTCA also
serves important military interests. Several military efficiency objectives can
be identified. The objectives of economy, discipline, restoration to duty, fed-
eral relationship and nondiscrimination will be discussed. First, the prohibi-
tion of FTCA suits saves government funds. 15 9 Having provided
administrative compensation, the government will be further burdened if it
has to pay servicemen under the FTCA. The added FTCA payments do not
appear to serve any congressional goals in the compensation of servicemen. In
fact, the current workings of the incident-to-service rule are likely to reward
least the serviceman injured while performing military duties and most likely
to reward the serviceman injured while making no immediate contribution to
the national defense. Congress may choose to correct the discrepancy by elim-
inating added compensation to the Brooks plaintiff.
Second, in some instances intramilitary suits can pose legitimate threats to
discipline. The most obvious cases involve the suit by the subordinate against
the superior. The opportunity to second-guess the commander through dis-
covery proceedings and trial can undermine the attitude of prompt and willing
obedience to lawful orders that should govern the subordinate-superior mili-
tary relationship. Suits by members of the same unit may also undermine unit
morale. The Supreme Court and lower courts have recognized the intangible
nature of military morale and discipline in other contexts and have been will-
ing to grant considerable discretion to the military in defining when they are
threatened. 160 Since these cases overrode constitutional values, surely the
prospect of a "more adequate verdict" for an injured serviceman here also is
of lesser counterweight.161
Third, the existence of an FTCA remedy can impede the crucial military
objective of prompt restoration of the injured serviceman to duty status. The
157. Id. § 2675.
158. E.g., Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1349 (E.D. Pa. 1970), afld, 466 F.2d
1226 (3d Cir. 1972); Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974).
159. The Supreme Court has recognized this factor in Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United
States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977) (compensation system "provides an upper limit of liability").
160. E.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980); Secretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676
(1974); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir.
1975).
161. Provisions of the FTCA give some protection of the command relationship. The "com-
batant activities" exception, 28 U.S.C. § 26800) (1976), and the "discretionary function" excep-
tion, id. § 2680(a), are the most notable. However, the "combat activities" exception does not
protect most peacetime exercises of command control. See Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767
(9th Cir. 1948). The "discretionary function" exception has been difficult to interpret. In recent
years courts have been less generous in according its protection to government activities. See
illman, The Changing Meanings of Discretion: Evolution in the Federal Tort Claims Act, 76
Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1977); Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975).
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prospect of a tort action (whether administrative or judicial) can cause the
soldier to spend time and concern on the litigation. The soldier preoccupied
with counsel interviews, depositions, trials and appeals can be expected to be a
less effective soldier. Further, the tort suit with its lump sum damage award at
the time of settlement or judgment may be a subtle disincentive to prompt and
full recovery. Litigation negotiations may encourage the overstatement of a
disability or of pain and suffering. These factors can slow return to duty or
lessen performance once the restoration to partial duty has occurred.
Fourth, beyond immediate disciplinary threats, the existence of the tort
remedy undercuts the relationship between soldier and government that Con-
gress and the Executive may desire to promote. A substantial body of socio-
logical literature has examined the nature of membership in the military.
162
While the military has become more like the civilian world over the past cen-
tury,163 the military remains distinct from the average government employ-
ment relationship. 164 The military relationship is far more pervasive than the
average employment situation.1 65 The military is both a job and a way of life.
The sense of mission, the distinctive military community, the obligatory as-
pects of the tour of duty, the forced companionship and the physical dangers
do make the military the "separate society" recognized by the Supreme
Court, 166 Congress, military leaders and scholarly commentators. An adver-
sary tort relationship with the United States or a fellow serviceman, regardless
of the command relationship, undercuts this concept. Soldiers can do wrong,
162. Three of the best studies are S. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (1957); M. Ja-
nowitz, The Professional Soldier (1960); C. Moskos, The American Enlisted Man (1970).
163. M. Janowitz, supra note 162, at 8, 21, 40-46.
164. C. Moskos, supra note 162, at 38, 170. The separateness of the military is further ad-
dressed in Moskos, From Institution to Occupation, Trends in Military Organization, 4 Armed
Forces & Soc'y 51 (1977); Stahl, McNichols & Manley, An Empirical Examination of the Moskos
Institution-Occupation Model, 6 Armed Forces & Soe'y 257 (1980).
165. Moskos, supra note 164 (details many distinctive features of military life).
166. Modem Supreme Court discussion of the role of the military has endorsed the theory of
the military as a "specialized society separate from civilian society" that has "developed laws and
traditions of its own." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974). The distinctive nature of the
military allows regulation of "a much larger segment of the activities of the more tightly knit
military community" than is ever done in the civilian community. Id. at 749. Thb Levy case
further distinguishes the military relationship to government, finding the government is "em-
ployer, landlord, provisioner, and lawgiver rolled into one." Id. at 751. The necessity for military
obedience justifies the distinction. While the Constitution does apply to members of the military,
it must be applied with a recognition of the differences between military and civilian society. The
fifth amendment expressly excepts the armed forces from the requirement of grand jury present-
ment. Military regulation of speech and petition activities is also permissible in circumstances that
would violate the first amendment in a non-military context. Id. at 456-58 (Articles 133 and 134 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.) not overbroad or void for vagueness); Brown v.
Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (military may impose prior review requirement on serviceman's right
to petition Congress because of potential threat to military discipline); Secretary of the Navy v.
Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974) (Article 134 of U.C.M.J. not unconstitutionally vague). See also
Secretary of the Navy v. Huff, 444 U.S. 453 (1980). The Court also sustained restraints on civilian
first amendment activity on military installations in Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). The
Court recognized the military installation could not be treated as a public forum for purposes of
literature distribution or political campaign appearances. Other decisions have recognized the
distinctive nature of the military criminal processes. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976)
(fifth and sixth amendments do not require presence of counsel at summary court-martial); Schles-
inger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975) (in most cases servicemen must exhaust all military
remedies before seeking civilian court review).
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but their misdeeds should be corrected within the military system. The mili-
tary should likewise provide for its own casualties. If mistakes causing injury
have occurred, it is essential to correct them to prevent further harm to mili-
tary performance. Worry over possible civil liability should not impede accu-
rate fact-finding. The combination of criminal and administrative sanctions
for the military wrongdoer adequately serves the necessary deterrent function.
Finally, the present or any expanded system of allowing some military
personnel access to both FTCA and military administrative remedies discrimi-
nates in ways undesirable for military morale. Commentators have decried
giving the civilian access to the FTCA while denying it to the soldier.167 The
critics forget that a more harmful discrimination exists between the recovery
given different soldiers under the present system. The soldier accepts many
distinctions between civilian and soldier. They exist in a variety of forms,
from dress to movement around the world, to early retirement, to a different
set of criminal laws, to restrictions on political activities. Surely no massive
discrimination occurs in limiting all active duty military personnel to the ad-
ministrative compensation program.
The more serious discrimination lies in the varied recoveries for military
injuries or death. Should a family be entitled to less compensation when their
son is a combat fatality than when he is killed on leave through government
negligence? Do supporters of limiting the incident-to-service rule feel that an
aviator, wounded and permanently disabled in combat due to government
negligence, should receive less compensation from the United States than an
airman injured by government negligence at a military recreation area? If the
complaint is a general inadequacy of military disability benefits, that issue
should be addressed by Congress. The present system provides occasional ir-
rational windfalls that serve no purpose in military planning.
On balance, it would be appropriate to handle intra-military tort claims
against the United States exclusively under the administrative compensation
programs. The Feres precedents could be modified to bar any FTCA suit by a
military plaintiff who is entitled to recover military benefits. The benefits sys-
tem provides a satisfactory basis for individual redress. The litigated cases
indicate that the injured soldier is unlikely to carry any other grievance against
the military beyond the desire to be compensated for injury. By contrast, sub-
stantial reasons of military efficiency encourage the use of the no-fault admin-
istrative program. Finally, no citizen-control objectives counsel against the
elimination of intramilitary FTCA remedies. Military negligent wrongdoing
is still reviewed by the courts when civilian plaintiffs are involved.
IV. SUITS AGAINST INDMDUAL MILITARY DEFENDANTS
Section II observed that British and American intramilitary tort prece-
dents arose out of suits by servicemen against individual military defendants.
The passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act in the United States focused at-
167. See note 152 and accompanying text supra.
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tention on the government as defendant. The Supreme Court's incident-to-
service cases forbade most suits against the government by the military for
tortious injury. However, neither the FTCA nor the Brooks-Feres-Brown tril-
ogy addressed the tort suit against the individual military defendant. The lim-
ited prospects for recovery against the United States under the FTCA have
encouraged military plaintiffs to sue individual military tortfeasors.
We examine suits against individual military defendants by military
plaintiffs in three, not always exclusive, categories. The first category involves
suits for ordinary negligence. The second involves suits based on certain com-
mon law torts-assault, battery, false imprisonment, defamation--originally
excluded from FTCA coverage.' 68 The third involves suits based on the con-
stitutional tort theory first enunciated in Bivens v. Six Unknown NamedAgents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics169 for federal military personnel and author-
ized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for state military personnel.
A. The Negligence Suit
The few cases that considered the issue prior to passage of the FTCA
rejected the intramilitary negligence suit because of concerns about harm to
military discipline and the existence of the administrative compensation sys-
tems. 170 Although the FTCA did not forbid suits against the individual gov-
ernment tortfeasor, the great majority of military tort victims sued only the
United States. 171 The Feres precedent soon emphasized that the military
plaintiff injured incident to service could not sue the United States. A few
dissatisfied servicemen plaintiffs then tried to sue the individual military
tortfeasors. The courts and Congress combined to thwart these plaintiffs.
Congress enacted a series of statutes immunizing certain government employ-
ees from tort suit for acts within their scope of employment. The favored cate-
gories of employees have been vehicle drivers, 172 Veterans Administration
medical personnel, 173 Public Health Service medical personnel 174 and, most
recently, military medical personnel.' 75 Typically the statutory action is the
result of a few lawsuits filed against individual government employees and
worries over burdens of liability on these employees.' 76 The immunity stat-
utes forbid suit by any plaintiff-civilian or military-against the government
168. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976) originally forbade any claims against the United States "aris-
ing out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of pro-
cess, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights." The exception
was phrased as the "intentional tort" exception. Despite its inaptness to some excluded items, the
term will be used here. A 1974 amendment to section 2680(h) (Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat.
50) allowed United States liability for certain torts of law enforcement officers.
169. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
170. See notes 59-69 and accompanying text supra.
171. Ajudgment in an FTCA action is a "complete bar to any action" against the government
employee tortfeasor. 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (1976).
172. Id. § 2679.
173. 38 U.S.C. § 4116 (1976).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 233 (1976).
175. 10 U.S.C. § 1089 (1976).
176. S. Rep. No. 1264, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
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employee. For the civilian plaintiff this compels action against the United
States under the FTCA. The military plaintiff is left with no tort remedy.
Feres bars the incident to service suit against the United States. The immu-
nity statute bars any action against the fellow serviceman covered by the im-
munity statute.
Courts also have endorsed an intramilitary immunity in cases against in-
dividual military defendants. The judicial decisions have mixed Fees
precepts and a perceived pre-Feres common law bar on intra-military negli-
gence actions. Bailey v. Van Buskirk, 177 a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case
decided in 1965, has served as the most cited precedent. There, an enlisted
man injured through medical malpractice while on active duty sued the Army
doctors as individuals. The court observed that the plaintiff had benefitted
from the "reasonably adequate" military compensation system. However, it
focused its justification of an intramilitary bar on negligence suits on the po-
tential harm to discipline. 'The idea is that an undisciplined army is a mob,
and he who is in it would weaken discipline if he can civilly litigate with others
over the performance of another man's army duty."' 78 Subsequent cases have
endorsed the Bailey logic with very limited analysis of the issues.' 79 Courts,
while recognizing that Feres does not control the issue, have relied on Feres to
prohibit the action against the serviceman defendant.
The notable exception to the judicial precedents is Henderson v.
Bluemink.18° The case involved suit by a civilian plaintiff against a military
doctor for malpractice. 18' The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
refused to prohibit absolutely tort suits against military doctors. Rather, the
court distinguished between policy decisions and purely medical decisions.
The court suggested immunity might be proper for policy decisions, but no
immunity should be given medical decisions. The case was remanded to de-
termine whether a grant of immunity was appropriate.182 The Henderson liti-
gation proved a major stimulant to passage of the military medical personnel
immunity statute.183 While individual immunity has now been mandated in
military medical cases, it remains to be seen how the Henderson case would
4443, 4445-47; S. Rep. No. 736, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1961 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2784, 2789-90, 2795-96 (Driver's Act).
177. 345 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1965).
178. Id. at 298.
179. Martinez v. Schrock, 537 F.2d 765 (3d Cir. 1976); Tirrill v. McNamara, 451 F.2d 579 (9th
Cir. 1971); Bailey v. DeQuevedo, 375 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1967); Howell v. United States, 489 F.
Supp. 147 (W.D. Tenn. 1980); Adams v. Banks, 407 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Va. 1976); Kennedy v.
Maginnis, 393 F. Supp. 310 (D. Mass. 1975); Roach v. Shields, 371 F. Supp. 1392 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
The application of Feres to individual defendant cases is criticized in Jacoby, supra note 128, at
1296-98.
180. 511 F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
181. The court did not express an opinion whether the United States would have been liable
under the FTCA. Id. at 403 n.26.
182. Id. at 404.
183. S. Rep. No. 1264, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
4443, 4445.
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apply to a suit by a serviceman against another serviceman for a negligent act
not covered by an immunity statute.
The negligence suits brought by military plaintiffs against military de-
fendants have almost without exception involved garden variety tort actions in
which there has been little threat to the superior-subordinate disciplinary rela-
tionship. 184 Most of the cases have involved medical malpractice. The suit is
brought against the individual defendant primarily because Feres bars the suit
against the United States. Courts' assertions that intramilitary negligence suits
are unthinkable ignore the Wilkes cases allowing suit for intentional tort in a
situation in which the disciplinary harm was far more serious.
While the threat of disciplinary harm is rather doubtful in the medical
malpractice case, the other factors supporting an intramilitary tort prohibition
in negligence actions against the United States also apply to negligence actions
against individual military defendants. 185 The statutory compensation system
does provide payment to the victim of government negligence. Congress
should define this as the limit on government payment. While an added tort
judgment against the individual could be paid by the individual doctor or his
malpractice insurer, the government also has a financial interest in judgment.
First, the government provides legal defense for the government employee
sued for activities within the scope of employment.' 8 6 The cost of supplying
government or private counsel can be considerable. Further, the government
may feel obligated to recompense the uninsured military defendant who is
found liable. Aside from direct expense, the individual immunity is a valuable
part of the indirect compensation given military personnel. Particularly for
certain professionals the freedom from the worries of malpractice liability is
part of the attraction of service life. This helps recruit and retain personnel at
a lower cost to the government.
187
The immunities also protect the military plaintiff and defendant from
work disruption. Some time is needed to investigate allegations of negligence,
but this is far short of the time needed to engage in.litigation. The intra-
military suit against the individual defendant also intiudes on the relations
between servicemen and the government in the ways discussed earlier.
A major argument against individual immunities focuses on the possible
encouragement of careless performance of duties. Both the military and the
citizenry will lose if freedom from tort liability encourages negligent injuries.
184. See, e.g., Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975) (negligent operation of
recreational stable); Mattos v. United States, 412 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1969) (vehicular negligence);
Bailey v. Van Buskirk, 345 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1965) (negligent surer); Thomason v. Sanchez, 398
F. Supp. 500 (D.N.J. 1975) (vehicular negligence), afl'd, 539 F.2d955 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1072 (1977); Garner v. Rathburn, 232 F. Supp. 598 (D. Colo. 1964) (work accident with
civilian foreman as defendant).
185. See section III.C. supra.
186. See Bell, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 16 Harv. J. Legis. 1, 7-9
(1979), in which the former Attorney General gives his perspective on the burden of defending
government employees.
187. See S. Rep. No. 1264, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 4443, 4447.
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Are military personnel less careful because they know they cannot be sued in
their individual capacity by some or all of their victims? When the military
plaintiff is involved, the issue is particularly significant. If immunity encour-
ages carelessness, the armed services are harmed because more personnel are
disabled for duty and the perception of co-workers' incompetence or careless-
ness may hamper the performance of duties. This perception may also en-
courage personnel to leave military service or never to enter in the first place.
The assessment of the effects of immunity will vary among categories of
military defendants. Consider, for example, two of the presently immunized
groups-vehicle drivers and medical doctbrs. The average driver is a low or
mid-level enlisted person who may be unaware of the existence of the immu-
nity and hardly threatened by the prospect of a large tort judgment against
him. Further, reckless driving threatens the drivers with physical harm, crimi-
nal sanction and possibly higher insurance rates on his personal vehicle. Bad
driving exists in the military, but it is doubtful that the immunity statute in-
creases it. The medical doctor may be in a different posture. The doctor is
almost certainly aware of the immunity statute and its implications, is free
from significant worry over criminal sanction and is not physically threatened
by his negligent conduct. The careless surgery, unlike the speeding jeep, only
harms the victim. The fear of malpractice suits and judgments is a meaningful
incentive to the military physician who may plan to move to more lucrative
civilian practice. On the other hand, the doctor's professional standards and
peer review provide a significant check on carelessness. The immunity statutes
and judicial holdings and their effect on performance deserve further evalua-
tion. If the individual immunity can be shown to reduce performance, some
immunities can be withdrawn. At present, however, the factors that support
limiting military claims against the United States would also support limiting
claims against other military members.
B. The Intentional Tort Cases
Intramilitary tort law originated from intentional tort actions brought by
subordinates against their superiors. Both British and American precedents
rejected the absolute immunity for the military defendant. In America the
Wilkes cases remain, a century after their decision, as precedent for the propo-
sition that in intentional tort suits by a subordinate, a miitary superior is enti-
tled to a qualified, but not an absolute, immunity.
188
Current military intentional tort cases are different from the negligence
cases. The differences stem from legal developments outside the intramilitary
litigation area and the nature of the complaints. Unfortunately, these develop-
ments have not been well analyzed in the few intramilitary suits against indi-
viduals for intentional torts.
The first legal development occurred when Congress initially distin-
188. Dinsman v. Wilkes, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 390 (1851); Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
89 (1849). See section 1.B. supra.
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guished between negligent and intentional torts for purposes of FTCA recov-
ery. The FTCA exempted most of the intentional torts from the government's
promise of recompense for negligent or wrongful actions of government em-
ployees. Section 2680(h) of the FTCA excludes claims "arising out of assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of pro-
cess, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract
rights." 89 Until 1974 the statutory exemption forced all plaintiffs, civilian
and military, to sue the individual government employee if they wanted any
recovery for these torts. In 1974 Congress recognized United States liability
for the physical torts of government law enforcement officers. 190 The United
States remains immune from liability for such torts as libel, slander and inter-
ference with contract relations and for physical torts committed by govern-
ment employees other than law enforcement officers. The statutory
amendment does not address the eligibility of military plaintiffs. However, the
Feres precedents suggest that the soldier abused by military police may be in a
different position from the civilian.
The second development significant for the resolution of intramilitary in-
tentional tort suits against individuals is the court-created immunity. Protec-
tion of persons involved in judicial proceedings and persons responsible for
preparing certain government information from suits in torts was well recog-
nized by the time the English intramilitary cases were decided. These protec-
tions were used to provide immunity to the officer involved in court-martial
proceedings or the officer preparing reports on the performance of subordi-
nates. American courts have adopted absolute immunity from civil damage
suits for participants in the judicial process' 91 and legislators. 192 Immunity
for executive officials has been less certain. The Wilkes litigation suggests only
qualified immunity.193 Spalding v. Vilas 194 gave absolute immunity from a
damage suit to a Cabinet officer sued "on account of official communications
made by him pursuant to an act of Congress, and in respect of matters within
his authority."'
195
Contemporary examination of immunity for executive officers began in
the wake of World War II with Judge Learned Hand's opinion for the Second
189. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976). Professor Jayson regards this justification for the intentional
tort exception as "unconvincing." L. Jayson, supra note 72, at § 260.01(1). The "scope of employ-
ment" requirement of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 2675(a) prevents widespread government liability
for uncontrolled actions of soldiers or other government employees. The discretionary, function
exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970), would prevent liability for major policy decisions that
would intrude on individual rights.
190. Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50 (1974), amending 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). See Boger,
Gitenstein & Verkuil, Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts Amendment: An Interpretative
Analysis, 54 N.C.L. Rev. 497 (1976).
191. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (judge); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 408
(1976) (prosecutor); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judge); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 335 (1871) (judge).
192. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 6.
193. See text accompanying notes 50-58 supra; Note, Qualified Immunity for Executive Offi-
cials for Constitutional Violations: Butz v. Economou, 20 B.C.L. Rev. 575 (1979).
194. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
195. Id. at 498. The opinion does not mention the Wilkes cases.
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Circuit Court of Appeals in Gregoire v. Biddle.196 Plaintiff sought damages for
four and one-half years wrongful detention as an enemy alien in World War
II. A prior court decision had supported plaintiff's habeas corpus action for
wrongful detention.1 97 In a second action, plaintiff claimed a violation of both
common-law and constitutional rights.' 98 He sought damages from two At-
torneys General and other high government officials responsible for his deten-
tion. Judge Hand held that prior Supreme Court precedents199 mandated
immunity from the common-law charge regardless of allegations of malice
and lack of probable cause. He justified the absolute immunity by the impos-
sibility of distinguishing meritorious from spurious claims. The "burden of a
trial and . . . the inevitable danger of its outcome" would discourage "the
unflinching discharge" of official duties.2°° Judge Hand further reflected that
"the public interest calls for action which may turn out to be founded on a
mistake." 201 In choosing between evils it was better to protect the government
official. Plaintiff's constitutional claim, brought under the civil rights statutes,
failed because all actions were taken under color of federal, not state, law.
A decade later the Supreme Court re-endorsed absolute executive immu-
nity in the companion cases of Barr v. Maleo
20 2 and Howard v. Lyons.203
Both cases involved allegedly defamatory remarks made by government offi-
cials. Both statements were related to the officials' duties, although both par-
took of political infighting against critics of their positions. A plurality of the
Court in Barr found that a government official was entitled to an absolute
privilege even though the defamatory statement was not compelled by his du-
ties. It was enough that the action be an appropriate exercise of discretion
"within the outer perimeter of defendant's line of duty."2°4 Howard v. Lyons
affirmed dismissal of a defamation action against a Navy captain for commu-
nicating to Congress criticism of civilian union representatives at his shipyard.
A majority of the Court found that the Barr plurality opinion governed the
case. The circulation of the defamatory statement was in the discharge of duty
and thus absolutely privileged.
205
The Gregoire opinion, with its endorsement by Barr and Howard, has
remained the most influential justification of an absolute immunity for execu-
tive officials in common-law intentional tort cases. Learned Hand's standard,
despite its popularity, is analytically unhelpful, a problem that is not solved by
196. 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
197. United States ex rel. Gregoire v. Watkins, 69 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), afl'd, 164
F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1947).
198. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
199. Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927), aflg 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926); Spalding v. Vilas,
161 U.S. 483 (1896).
200. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d at 581.
201. Id.
202. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
203. 360 U.S. 593 (1959).
204. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. at 574-75.
205. Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959). Justice Stewart joined the Howard opinion to
make a majority. In Barr he did not believe the defendant was acting in the line of duty. 360 U.S.
at 592 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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the subsequent Barr and Howard decisions. The objectives of absolute immu-
nity are not well defined. The types of governmental harm are not distin-
guished. Gregoire may be a case of a real injustice causing some of the most
serious harms government can inflict.20 6 The Barr and Howard injuries are of
a lesser magnitude. Neither Gregoire, with its wartime national security as-
pects, nor Howard, with its naval officer defendant, attempt to define any spe-
cial military privilege. The results are, of course, favorable to the government
official-absolute immunity. Nonetheless, neither the Second Circuit nor the
Supreme Court took the opportunity to qualify their broad assertions of abso-
lute immunity by reference to the national defense aspects of the litigation.
20 7
The courts do not even mention the Wilkes cases in which a military officer
operating well within the outer perimeter of duties in a matter of discretion did
not receive an absolute immunity.
That the intramilitary intentional tort cases brought against individual
defendants consistently have failed is due in part to the nature of the claims.
208
The cases involve claims for defamation, harm to military career, false impris-
onment and battery. In most cases the plaintiff is a subordinate of the defend-
ant or has been ordered for evaluation by the defendant. The controversy
involves a major disagreement over the performance of military duties. Dis-
putes have involved the preparation of military personnel efficiency reports,
20 9
the reference of plaintiff for psychiatric evaluation, 210 the designation of par-
ticular shipboard duties2 1' and the assignment of soldiers to combat.
2 12 Mili-
tary defendants have relied on two theories of defense. The first relies on
Feres. The second relies on Gregoire, Barr and Howard. On occasion, both
doctrines are cited to support a decision dismissing plaintiffs case. The opin-
ions have been rather summary. None of the Gregoire-Barr opinions spend
much time distinguishing "discretionary" from "non-discretionary" duties or
206. Portions of Judge Hand's opinion reflect on the unfairness of an absolute immunity to
plaintiffs with legitimate grievances. 177 F.2d at 581.
207. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) and Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944), in which the Court found that national security considerations may justify
otherwise unconstitutional acts of government.
208. Tigue v. Swaim, 585 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1978) (libel and false imprisonment); Pagano v.
Martin, 397 F.2d 620 (4th Cir. 1968) (defamation); Sigler v. LeVan, 485 F. Supp. 185 (D. Md.
1980) (false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion, assault and bat-
tery); Schmid v. Rumsfeld, 481 F. Supp. 19 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (violation of fifth amendment rights);
Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979) (portion of injuries occurred while on
active duty); Miller v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 116 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (death incident to military
service); Misko v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 513 (D.D.C. 1978), aft'd, 593 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (malpractice); Calhoun v. United States, 475 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Cal. 1977) (death incident to
military service), afl'd, 604 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (980); Lei iton v.
Peters, 356 F. Supp. 900 (D. Hawaii 1973) (discretionary acts performed within outer mit ofofficial duties); Rotko v. Abrams, 338 F. Supp. 46 (D. Conn. 1971) (death occurred during combatactivity), aft'd, 455 F.2d 992 (2d Cir. 1972); Gamage v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 381 (N.D. Cal.
1962) (defamation, assault, battery, false imprisonment, misrepresentation, deceit, injuries inci-
dent to service).
209. Pagano v. Martin, 397 F.2d 620 (4th Cir. 1968).
210. Tigue v. Swaim, 585 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1978); Gamage v. United States, 217 
F. Supp. 381
(N.D. Cal. 1962).
211. Leighton v. Peters, 356 F. Supp. 900 (D. Hawaii 1973).
212. Rotko v. Abrams, 338 F. Supp. 46 (D. Conn. 1971), afl'd, 455 F.2d 992 (2d Cir. 1972).
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delineating the "outer perimeter" of military duties. None of the Feres-based
opinions suggest the difference between negligent and intentional torts. None
mention Wilkes.
The intentional tort cases raise different issues from the negligence ac-
tions. The military compensation system is not designed to redress many of
the intentional tort injuries. A seriously injured battery victim may benefit to
the extent of receiving free medical care and recompense for disability. How-
ever, a military determination that the injury was due to plaintiffs willful mis-
conduct (for example, resisting arrest) would bar any eligibility under the
compensation system. Victims of false imprisonment or defamation seek dam-
ages not compensable under the administrative benefits scheme. Individual
redress in the military intentional tort cases includes more than monetary
compensation. In these cases, unlike the negligence cases, the serviceman
plaintiff feels put upon by military authority. Dollar damages can help but
typically the plaintiff wants a declaration that he is in the right. The plaintiff
can look to remedies under the Uniform Code of Military Justice2 13 and in the
civilian courts214 that offer the opportunity for vindication of reputation. Mil-
itary administrative procedures, such as the review of military discharges and
records, also can correct failings addressed in the intentional tort cases.
2 15
These remedies in some circumstances provide a more satisfactory remedy
than the tort damage action against the individual wrongdoer. In other cir-
cumstances, the lack of a tort suit against the military wrongdoer leaves the
individual victim without redress.
The harm to military efficiency from intramilitary intentional tort suits is
more serious than that involved in negligence litigation. All of the factors that
support a ban on intramilitary suits for negligence apply to the intentional tort
actions. In the intentional tort cases, serious disciplinary disruption is present
in virtually every litigated case. The actions have tended to be subordinates'
attempts to redress wrongs by superiors. Most involve the kinds of personality
differences first seen in Sutton, and then in the Dawkins and Wilkes litigations.
Civilian factfinders must consider the possibility of upsetting the command
structure and discouraging fearless pursuit of duty by military superiors. They
must also assess whether they are better able to reach the truth of a discipli-
nary dispute than are members of the military. Many jurors and a growing
percentage of judges have no first-hand knowledge of the military society.
Asking a jury or a judge to assess the special needs of military discipline may
be impossible. Nor is a qualified immunity-protecting good faith action
taken with probable cause-always sufficient. The military plaintiff in a tort
213. 10 U.S.C. § 938 (1976) (complaint against commander).
214. The expanded powers of the Court of Claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976), give a forum to
contest cases for interference with military career advantage. The statute gives jurisdiction over
claims against the United States founded on the Constitution, federal statutes, executive regula-
tions, contract with the United States, or "for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding 'in tort."' Id. Since 1972 the Court may "complete the relief afforded by the judgment"
by ordering restoration to office, placement in appropriate duty or retirement status and correction
of records. Id.
215. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 1552-53 (1976).
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suit will feel a real resentment against the commander and others in the mili-
tary hierarchy. Plaintiff will firmly believe the allegations of malice in his
complaint. In many cases there will be elements of blame in defendant's con-
duct. The military commander, faced with heavy pressures to please his
superiors and run a problem-free organization, may overreact to the dissenter,
the malcontent or the substandard performer in the unit. In such a situation
the judge may be reluctant to dismiss on the pleadings and let the case go for
full and time-consuming fact finding.
2 16
The civilian control objective also takes on different aspects in the inten-
tional tort cases. The harms are of the sort that may suggest systemwide defi-
ciencies in the forces-excessive brutality, insufficient attention to individual
liberties, racial discrimination, and so on. A grant of immunity might tend to
encourage this undesirable conduct.
On balance, the disciplinary concerns suggest that the absolute immunity
approach is sound in intramilitary intentional tort situations, at least as they
involve the command relationship and incidents arising out of military duty.
Present remedies provide some individual redress. The harm to military effi-
ciency if immunity is not allowed is considerable. A partial resolution of the
conflicting interests might occur by granting military officials power to give
corrective damage awards for tortious wrongs not corrected by other parts of
the military compensation system.
C. The Constitutional Tort
The suit for damages for violations of constitutional rights has been one
of the major tort developments of the last two decades. The initial vehicle for
such suits was section 1983 of the federal Civil Rights Act, which authorized
suits to redress deprivations of constitutional rights taken under color of state
law.217 The "section 1983" suit has been a large factor in the development of
government tort law. The impact of section 1983 on military litigation has
been limited because of the requirement that the government action be taken
under color of state law. The federal portions of the military have thus re-
mained outside section 1983, as the abbreviated discussion in Gregoire of a
statutory civil rights claim against federal officials indicates.218
The state national guard does remain subject to section 1983, but cases
involving guardsmen have been rare. The notable exception is Scheuer v.
Rhodes,219 in which Ohio National Guardsmen, from enlisted men to the
State Adjutant General, were sued for depriving victims of the 1970 Kent
State shootings of their civil rights. The United States Supreme Court ruled
against the defense claims of the military personnel and other state officials,
including the Governor, that they were entitled to Barr-like absolute immu-
nity. The Court provided a qualified immunity of "varying scope... depen-
216. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Wilson, 431 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. IUl. 1977).
217. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
218. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
219. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
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dent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the
circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which
liability is sought to be based." Defendant's good faith and a reasonable belief
under all the circumstances that the actions taken were proper would provide
immunity.220 The "all the circumstances" test was not given further defini-
tion. In particular, the Court made no effort to grant any unique immunity to
the military participants. The Court recognized the crisis aspects of the Kent
State situation but reflected that "the decision to invoke military power has
traditionally been viewed with suspicion and skepticism since it often involves
the temporary suspension of some of our most cherished rights."
221
Scheuer is one of a series of holdings that grant only qualified immunity
to most executive branch officials when they are acting in violation of constitu-
tional rights.222 At present the judicial, legislative and prosecutorial processes
receive the benefit of absolute immunity.2 23 Other executive branch activities
do not.
Action against federal officials for constitutional violations were doubly
stymied until the 1970s. First, until 1974 the Federal Tort Claims Act forbade
suits for many of the intentional torts. Many of these torts-false imprison-
ment, battery, false arrest--could have been converted to constitutional viola-
tions when officials of government were the tortfeasors. Second, there existed
no equivalent of section 1983 that allowed suit against federal officials, includ-
ing the federal military, for constitutional deprivations.
Within three years both barriers collapsed. The initial actor was the
United States Supreme Court. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics,224 the Court held that the fourth amendment
itself authorized suit for damages against federal police officers involved in an
unlawful search and seizure. The subsequent opinion of the Second Circuit
brought the further statement that the officers were entitled to only a qualified
immunity based on good faith and reasonable belief in the rightness of their
actions. 225 Cases since Bivens have extended the right of action for constitu-
tional torts to other constitutional amendments. Davis v. Passman226 recog-
nized a right of action for a violation of fifth amendment due process for
sexual discrimination. Carlson v. Green227 recognized fifth and eighth amend-
ment causes of action for intentionally bad medical treatment given prison
inmates. It is reasonable to assume that the Supreme Court will eventually
220. Id. at 247-48.
221. Id. at 246.
222. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (prison administrators); O'Connor v. Don-
aldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (state hospital administrator); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975)
(school administrator).
223. See cases cited in notes 191 & 192 supra.
224. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
225. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339,
1347 (2d Cir. 1972).
226. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
227. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
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find other provisions of the Bill of Rights to be the source of constitutional
damage claims.
Three years after Bivens, Congress amended the Tort Claims Act to allow
individuals to sue the United States for certain intentional torts committed by
federal law enforcement officers.228 The amendment was stimulated by sev-
eral particularly outrageous examples of federal narcotics officer miscon-
duct.229 Had it been on the books, the amendment would probably have
authorized Bivens to recover by administrative or judicial means from the
United States. Nonetheless, by 1974 two avenues of relief had been recog-
nized for certain intentional actions by officials of government. In the first,
Bivens allowed actions against the individual officers, but with the expectation
of government-paid defense and possible compensation. Unlike section 1983
and the Tort Claims Act, the remedy was created by the Constitution and the
courts. In the second, the FTCA amendment covered common-law torts com-
mitted by federal law enforcement officers.
The Bivens opinion reflected on the injustice of denying any remedy to
persons wronged by unconstitutional conduct of federal officials. The later
amendment to the Tort Claims Act raised the question of the relation between
the two theories of action. The most recent Supreme Court constitutional tort
cases provide some guidance for accommodating the judicial and legislative
remedies. Davis v. Passman allowed a damage remedy for sexual employment
discrimination by a member of Congress. The Court observed that Congress
had not forbidden damage recovery by persons harmed by employment dis-
crimination. The Court observed that if Congress were "to create equally ef-
fective alternative remedies, the need for damages relief might be
obviated."230
Davis did not involve a remedy under the FTCA. In Carlson v. Green the
Court faced the interrelationship of the FTCA and the Bivens suit. Plaintiffs
sued federal prison officials for the death of their incarcerated son. The crux
of their complaint was intentionally inadequate medical care which allowed
the son's asthma attack to kill him. The Court stated that "Bivens established
that the victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right to
recover damages against the official in federal court despite the absence of any
statute conferring such a right."231 The Court noted two exceptions to the rule
drawn from Bivens and Passman. The first is when defendants demonstrate
"special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress."' 232 The second is the presence of a congressional remedy "which
[Congress] explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the
Constitution and viewed as equally effective. '233 Neither factor was present
228. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976).
229. See S. Rep. No. 588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 2789, 2790.
230. 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979).
231. 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 18-19.
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in Carlson. The federal jailers did not enjoy such independent status in the
constitutional scheme to make judicial remedies inappropriate. They would
be entitled to qualified immunity, but no more. Second, nothing in the FTCA
as originally enacted, or as amended in 1974, preempted a Bivens remedy.
Comments from the 1974 legislative history reflect a desire to offer victims
both the FTCA and the Bivens remedies.234 The Court then observed that the
FTCA remedy would be less effective than a Bivens remedy because (1) the
suit against the individual had a greater deterrent effect than the suit against
the government; (2) the Bivens suit would authorize the recovery of punitive
damages; (3) the Bivens suit would allow trial by jury; and (4) the Bivens ac-
tion would rely on uniform rules of federal law rather than "the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred" used in the FTCA.235 The Court
concluded: "Plainly FTCA is not a sufficient protector of the citizens' consti-
tutional rights, and without a clear congressional mandate we cannot hold that
Congress relegated respondent exclusively to the FTCA remedy."
236
Further uncertainty as to remedies and immunities was created by the
1978 Supreme Court decision in Butz v. Economou. 237 Economou had been
subjected to administrative disciplinary action by the Department of Agricul-
ture. He retorted with suits against the officials. The suits alleged both com-
mon-law and constitutional claims. The Court focused on the constitutional
claims and defendant's contention that Barr provided absolute immunity so
long as the "discretionary" and "outer perimeter of duties" tests could be met.
The Supreme Court disagreed and found that Barr did not protect federal
officials who "violated those fundamental principles of fairness embodied in
the Constitution." 238 Rather, the Bivens-Scheuer qualified immunity prece-
dents controlled. "We therefore hold that, in a suit for damages arising from
unconstitutional action, federal executive officials exercising discretion are en-
titled only to the qualified immunity specified in Scheuer, subject to those ex-
ceptional situations where it is demonstrated that absolute immunity is
essential for the conduct of the public business.
2 39
The five-four decision emphasized the Supreme Court's distrust of abso-
lute immunity for executive branch officials. The case also suggested the
Court's belief that a meaningful distinction could be drawn between common-
law torts and the newer, constitutionally based actions. Barr was not over-
ruled, and the Court rejected the premise that artful pleading could turn any
intentional wrong by a federal official into a constitutional tort.240
234. Id. at 24 (citing S. Rep. No. 588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2789, 2790).
235. Id. at 21-23.
236. Id. at 23.
237. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). See Burgess, Official Immunity and Civil Liability for Constitu-
tional Torts Committed by Military Commanders after Butz v. Economou, 89 Mil. L. Rev. 25
(1980).
238. 438 U.S. at 495.
239. Id. at 507.
240. Id. at 507-08.
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Recent intramilitary tort suits reflect constitutional tort precepts.24' The
courts have been divided on their resolution and their analyses are less than
clear. Lawsuits often combine constitutional claims with more familiar inten-
tional tort claims. Suits are brought against the United States under the
FTCA and against individual military defendants under common law and
constitutional theories. The military defendant has several responses to the
constitutional tort suit. The first is to deny that the provision of the constitu-
tion authorizes a suit for damages. Davis and Green suggest that an attempt to
interpret Bivens narrowly is unlikely to succeed. The second response is to
recognize a constitutional cause of action, but to assert that special circum-
stances authorize an absolute immunity as defined in Butz or other immunity
cases. The third response is to assert that the Feres rationale prohibits suits
sounding in tort between service members even when the complaint is consti-
tutionally based. The fourth, and least satisfactory alternative, is to defend the
action, relying on whatever form of qualified immunity has been found appro-
priate. Four intramilitary cases reflect the different responses to the constitu-
tional allegations. Misko v. United States,242 allowing absolute immunity,
illustrates reliance on Feres. Plaintiff servicemen sued for an illegal medical
confinement alleging a cause of action under the fifth amendment. The Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia did not decide whether a constitutional
cause of action was proper under that amendment because it felt Feres and the
separate intramilitary tradition forbade recovery. Barr and other immunity
decisions were not controlling because of the "special intramilitary immunity
questions" involved. The court rejected any exception to Feres for constitu-
tional torts because the Feres justification applied equally to those suits. Any
other result would allow an abrogation of Feres through an "exercise in plead-
ing."243 Judge Sirica's decision in Misko was affirmed by the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia after the Butz decision.
Tigue v. Swaim244 involved an Air Force captain's complaint against a
241. Jaffee v. United States (Jaffee 1), 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.) (United States and individual
defendants; constitutional tort), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979); Tigue v. Swaim, 585 F.2d 909
(8th Cir. 1978) (individual defendant; intentional and constitutional tort); Everett v. United States,
492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (United States defendant; negligent, intentional and constitu-
tional torts); Schnurman v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Va. 1980) (United States defend-
ant; negligence and constitutional torts); Sigler v. LeVan, 485 F. Supp. 185 (D. Md. 1980)
(individual defendants; intentional and constitutional torts); Semid v. Rumsfeld, 481 F. Supp. 19
(N.D. Cal. 1979) (individual defendants; constitutional torts); Nagy v. United States, 471 F. Supp.
383 (D.D.C. 1979) (United States and individual defendants; negligent and constitutional torts);
Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979) (United States and individual defend-
ants; negligent, intentional and constitutional torts); Misko v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 513
(D.D.C. 1978) (United States and individual defendants; negligent and constitutional torts), afl'd,
593 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Calhoun v. United States, 475 F. Supp. I (S.D. Cal. 1977) (United
States and individual defendants; wrongful death and constitutional torts), afrd, 604 F.2d 647 (9th
Cir. 1979); Alvarez v. Wilson, 431 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (individual defendants; constitu-
tional torts); Milliken v. United States, 439 F. Supp. 290 (D. Kan. 1976) (United States defendant;
intentional and constitutional torts); Birdwell v. Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 710 (D. Colo. 1975)
(individual defendants; constitutional torts).
242. 453 F. Supp. 513 (D.D.C. 1978), afld, 593 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
243. Id. at 515.
244. 585 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1978).
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base hospital commander for libel and false imprisonment. The action arose
out of a forced psychiatric evaluation of the plaintiff. The court of appeals
construed Tigue's complaint to state a constitutional cause of action for depri-
vation of liberty without due process of law. The court then examined the
protection provided defendant by Butz v. Economou. The court rejected de-
fendant's contentions that Butz authorized an absolute immunity for suits that
interfere with a military command relationship. Rather, Butz compelled "a
particularized inquiry into the functions an official performs and the circum-
stances under which they are performed." 245 However, since defendant
Swaim was in charge of a medical evaluation program to assess the emotional
capability of personnel with access to nuclear weapons, and "national security
interests are involved," he was entitled to an absolute immunity in making his
assessment of Tigue's mental state. The Feres issue was raised but not decided
by the court.2
46
Alvarez v. Wilson247 involved a military officer's suit for deprivation of
liberty and racial discrimination in a dispute over the conduct of a military
race relations program. The plaintiff sued only individual military officers.
The district court denied defendants' motion to dismiss. The court recognized
an action to recover damages for fifth amendment violations. It then rejected
defendants' claim of absolute immunity. While recognizing unique military
disciplinary needs, the court found that defendants' actions were far short of
"the brink of combat." Nor were defendants involved in recruit training. Bal-
anced against this was the severity of the alleged deprivation of rights suffered
by plaintiff.248 On the existing facts, defendants' good faith was not shown,
and the case was continued for further fact finding. The court made no men-
tion of Feres or any other intramilitary immunity.
The most thorough study of constitutional tort in the intramilitary context
is the February 1980 opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Jaffee v. United States (Jaffee 11).249 Plaintiff alleged that while a serviceman
in the early 1950's he had been ordered to observe nuclear weapons tests in the
Nevada desert. Massive radiation exposure occurred as a consequence. Plain-
tiff alleged this wrongful conduct on the part of the Government had caused
him to develop cancer two decades later. Jaffee filed suit against the United
States under the FTCA and against the individual military and civilian offi-
cials allegedly responsible for deprivation of his rights under the first, fourth,
fifth, eighth and ninth amendments. A prior Third Circuit Court of Appeals
decision dismissed the FTCA action against the United States on sovereign
immunity grounds.250 The district court dismissed the remaining suit against
245. Id. at 914.
246. Id. at 914 n.10.
247. 431 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Il. 1977).
248. Id. at 145-46.
249. Jaffee v. United States (Jaffee I1), No. 79-1543 (3d Cir., filed Feb. 20, 1980), vacated, 663
F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981). See Postscript infra.
250. Jaffee v. United States (Jaffeel), 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), tert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979).
The case is discussed at notes 5-10 and accompanying text supra, and in Note, 12 Conn. L. Rev.
492, 496-98, 509, 520 (1980).
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the individual defendants on Feres grounds. The court of appeals held that
Feres did not control actions for willful violations of constitutional rights.
The court of appeals traced the divergent threads of the Feres and Gregoire
precedents. Gregoire's absolute immunity was "a politically attractive idea" in
the years immediately following World War 11.251 That belief gave way in
cases like Bivens, Scheuer and Butz to the greater concern that public officials
could do serious harm to the citizenry if freed from any worries over their
responsibility. The court viewed plaintiff's complaint as alleging "infringe-
ments of liberty . . . in subjecting soldiers to radiation without legal
authority."
252
The court then rejected the application of the Feres case. Initially, the
court found that a uniform federal law standard could apply to assess govern-
ment liability for constitutional wrongs. This undercut any fear that military
liability might be decided by inconsistent rules of state law. The court then
resurrected the Wilkes decisions to validate a distinction between intramilitary
negligence suits and intramilitary intentional tort suits. The court observed
the Supreme Court had not overruled Wilkes and the Congress had not pro-
vided an absolute immunity for all military personnel. The controlling princi-
ples in Jaffee therefore were those of the qualified immunity cases. In closing,
the court found that plaintiffs had at least stated a constitutional cause of ac-
tion under the fifth amendment. It also rejected defendant's claim that veter-
ans-benefit legislation was an exclusive remedy. The court found nothing in
the legislation that preempted private remedies against individuals or nothing
that eliminated "the deterrence which potential personal liability for inten-
tional wrongdoing provides. '253 The order dismissing the individual liability
counts of plaintiff's complaint was reversed.
254
Misko, Tue, Alvarez and Jaffee illustrate the difficult issues raised by the
new generation of intramilitary tort cases. Their facts suggest that an auto-
matic application of the Feres doctrine ignores significant differences between
negligence suits against the United States under the FTCA and constitutional
tort actions against individual military defendants. The decisions also suggest
that more weighty issues may be involved in constitutional tort than common-
law intentional tort cases.255 Allegations of racial discrimination or denial of
rights of free speech do not fit comfortably into old intentional tort theories.
Allegations of intentional medical experimentation on soldiers do appear of
greater magnitude than random cases of military police brutality or discontent
over a harsh efficiency report. In this regard Jaffee is the most complete of the
four opinions. It analyzes both the Feres strain and the qualified immunity
251. Jaffee v. United States (Jaffee fl), No. 79-1543, slip op. at 8 (3d Cir., fied Feb. 20, 1980).
252. Id. at 14.
253. Id. at 25.
254. Id. Judge Higginbotham's concurrence expressed his preference for absolute immunity
in the case. He states that Dinsman v. Wilkes, while questionable, still compelled the court to
recognize less than an absolute immunity. Id. at 28. (Higginbotham, J., concurring).
255. Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a
Critique, 72 Nw. U.L. Rev. 526, 549-50 (1977), argues for such a distinction.
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precedents. Misko too easily assumes that Feres controls al. Alvarez and
Tigue by contrast ignore the intramilitary precedents.
The factors for analysis of intramilitary tort claims suggest that the consti-
tutional tort suits pose difficult policy choices. Many of the issues are similar
to the intentional tort cases. Other issues in these constitutional tort cases raise
new concerns.
The individual redress objective is not well treated under present law.
The existing military compensation system was not designed to remedy claims
for unlawful imprisonment, deprivation of speech rights, removal from advan-
tageous duty assignments on racial grounds or illegal medical experimentation
from which no adverse consequences have developed. The military compen-
sation system can give no damage award. Even the Court of Claims may have
difficulty fashioning a proper award, as the newness of constitutional tort the-
ory makes it difficult to value awards.256 Even when monetary awards are
possible under the military compensation system (for example, the availability
of veterans benefits for a service-induced radiation cancer), the seriousness of
the wrongdoing leaves one with the feeling that justice has not been done.
The constitutional claims also involve redress beyond dollar damage.
Like many of the intentional tort cases, the bitterness against the defendant
may demand a more thorough vindication. Plaintiff may desire to expose
widespread wrongs done by the service.
The intramilitary cases in constitutional tort also affect military efficiency
far more than the negligence cases. Misko, Alvarez and Tigue address sensi-
tive issues of fitness for duty. The civilian courts again must assess whether
they can better perform the fact-finding role than can the military com-
manders involved or the independent military review process. Even if they
can, what is the effect of their decision on the disciplinary posture of the im-
mediate unit and the military in general?
Jaffee in particular illustrates the potential for interference with military
efficiency. Plaintiff alleged he performed duties under military orders. The
prospect of soldiers challenging hazardous duty orders in court certainly poses
a major challenge to military discipline. Here, however, the misconduct is a
quarter century in the past. All of the defendants are long removed from posi-
tions of command. The plaintiff presents the case as one of shocking disregard
for human life, violating not just constitutional precepts but international rules
of humanity as well.25 7 Fact-finding is needed to determine how much de-
fendants knew in 1952 of the harms from radiation and why they exposed the
256. See generally Note, 64 Cornell L. Rev. 667, 693-97 (1979) (the few successful Bivens-type
plaintiffs have received small or nominal damage awards).
257. Plaintiffs Supplementary Brief, Issue II, at 12-20, Jaffee v. United States, No. 79-1543 (3d
Cir., filed Feb. 20, 1980) is entitled "The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
The Nuremburg Code, The Geneva Convention, and the Entirety of the Law of Nations All
Provide A Basis For A Federal Damage Action By A Former Serviceman Against Government
Officials Who Willfully, and Without Legitimate Purpose, Subjected Him To A Dangerous Exper-
iment Without First Obtaining His Informed Consent."
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plaintiff and others to the risks they did.258 It is fair to assume that the exer-
cise did seek to discover whether troops would be disabled by close exposure
to atomic attack. The military's curiosity was more than a matter of academic
theory or demented sadism. Nuclear weapons were, and are, a major part of
the United States capability. Under certain circumstances it is essential that
troops work in conjunction with the weapons. The military certainly has an
interest in determining before actual combat whether and how well troops can
-respond to the explosion, the radiation and the psychological impact of these
new weapons.
Plaintiff's complaint that this was an improper use of troops or that only
troops giving informed consent to the exercise should have been used has
some inherent difficulties. From the point of view of the military, an informed
consent may have vitiated the purpose of the exercise. The goal may have
been to test the response of the average soldier, not the most adventuresome or
fool-hardy. Further speculation before the fact about the consequences of ex-
posure may have changed the response of even the willing participants. Fi-
nally, and most importantly, the informed consent could only rely on what
was known to the nuclear radiation experts at the time. Probably different
experts would have differed in their assessments of the risks involved, from
hazardous to trivial. The precedent could also suggest opening innumerable
other military activities to an assessment of risk. What distinguishes Jaffee
from victims of live-fire training courses, paratroop practice exercises and ill-
considered search and destroy missions in Vietnam?
The Jaff'ee complaint emphasizes the civilian review objective that looms
large in the constitutional tort cases. Allegations of medical experimentation
or racial discrimination in the military raise questions about the type of armed
force the citizens of the United States desire to maintain. We as citizens fear
for harm to the members of the armed forces. We fear the implications for its
use in combat against other nations. We fear having the armed forces turned
against United States civilians. Legitimate claims of constitutional wrongdo-
ing in the armed forces deserve ventilation. If tort immunities prevent their
exposure, the immunities may ill serve national objectives.
A difficult first task is defining unconstitutional conduct in the military.
The Constitution itself recognizes that the military society is not identical to
the civilian society. 259 The Supreme Court260 and the Congress have vali-
dated other distinctions between military and civilian society. A court assess-
ing the military constitutional tort thus has an additional element for
decision-should the Constitution apply to the military community in the
same way it applies to the civilian? Again Jaffee is illustrative. Involuntary
subjection to medical experimentation sounds heinous in the civilian context.
In the military, with its statutorily mandated duty to obey orders and be pres-
258. See Favish, Radiation Injury and the Atomic Veteran: Shifting the Burden of Proof on
Factual Causation, 32 Hastings L.J. 933, 934-36 (1981).
259. U.S. Const. amend. V.
260. See note 166 supra.
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ent for duty,261 involuntariness has different shades of meaning.
These factors suggest that Congress rather than the courts may be best
able to assess major tortious allegations of wrongdoing by the military. Con-
gress or the Executive will be better able to assess any disciplinary conse-
quences of an award for plaintiffs and the consequences of such an award on
the overall budget for military compensation. Congressional attention is quite
likely to secure the public exposure necessary to stimulate correction of mili-
tary failings.
262
The question remains whether executive or congressional action can re-
solve the intramilitary suit for constitutional deprivation. Carlson v. Green
suggests that the Supreme Court would probably respect a clear congressional
resolution of the treatment of intramilitary suits for deprivations of constitu-
tional rights. The military cases may present "special factors counselling hesi-
tation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress." 263 While the military
is not an equivalent branch of government as Congress was in Passman, the
Court itself has recognized the military as a distinctive part of government. 264
More directly, Congress could create the remedy "explicitly declared to be a
substitute for recovery under the Constitution and viewed as equally effec-
tive."265 Congress could legislate an absolute immunity for all military de-
fendants from any type of tort suit, basing this judgment on the threats to
military control, the adequacy of existing military and veterans compensation
schemes, and the presence of alternative means of complaint through the mili-
tary and civilian court systems. In some constitutional tort cases this would
provide a remedy. Jaffee could have been compensated by the receipt of serv-
ice-connected disability benefits. However, victims of unlawful confinement
or denial of first amendment rights might be left with only a declaration of
military wrongdoing, but no monetary award. The Carlson Court's discomfort
with FTCA limitations suggests that monetary recovery is a valuable element
of the "equally effective" remedy to the constitutional tort.
A more sensible congressional remedy would recognize that some wrongs
to military personnel are not presently accounted for in the military claims
procedures. These include both intentional and constitutional wrongs. Con-
gress could authorize the military claims services to entertain and pay admin-
istrative claims for proven acts of wrongdoing committed by military
personnel acting under color of military authority.266 The statute would also
bar suit against the individual defendant so long as he was acting under color
261. 10 U.S.C. §§ 885-86, 890-92 (1976).
262. The Thornwell litigation recently was settled by Congress for $625,000. Thornwel's suit
against the United States for the Army's prolonged interrogation, abuse and involuntary adminis-
tration of LSD was dismissed on immunity grounds. Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344
(D.D.C. 1979). The Army recommended a $1.7 million settlement. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1981, § 1,
at 31, col. 1.
263. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-20 (1980).
264. See note 166 supra. See also U.S. Coast. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-16.
265. 446 U.S. at 18-19 (1980).
266. Attorney General Bell has advocated United States liability for constitutional torts with
provisions for liquidated damages. See Bell, supra note 186, at 10-11.
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of authority. A limit would be set on the amount payable to a claimant.
While awards above that amount could be investigated by military claims offi-
cials, their payment would require congressional appropriation. A limit of
$10,000 to $25,000 would allow a significant monetary award to the injured
military claimant to correct harms not compensated by the existing claims sys-
tem. It would also provide for military assessment of claims of serious inten-
tional wrongdoing with final review in Congress. Judicial review of the
decisions should be prohibited.
V. CONCLUSION
The complexity of the tort and immunity doctrines affecting the military
suggests the need for legislative clarification. Waste and confusion character-
ize the present posture of intramilitary tort law. Congress should reassess all
elements of intramilitary litigation.
This Article suggests that the proper resolution is to provide a generalized
immunity for suits against individual military members except when the suits
are for acts wholly unrelated to duty. Suits against the United States under the
FTCA by military plaintiffs should be forbidden in any instance in which the
injured plaintiff would be entitled to benefits under the military compensation
system. Other wrongdoing, whether phrased as intentional or constitutional
wrongdoing, should be compensable within the military or by Congress under
new statutory authorization allowing payment for these harms.
POSTSCRIPT
Since this Article was set in page proofs, eight new federal decisions have
addressed intramilitary immunity questions. The most notable decision oc-
curred on November 2, 1981, when the Third Circuit Court of Appeals va-
cated its earlier decision in Jaffee 11.267 The majority of a badly splintered en
banc court agreed that the justifications for intramilitary immunity applied to
causes of action brought under state law or constitutional theories against indi-
vidual defendants. Other court of appeals and district court opinions have
applied the intramilitary immunity to bar FTCA, constitutional and other
actions.26
8
Two decisions have rejected defendants' requests for absolute intramili-
tary immunity. In Wallace v. ChappeP269 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reviewed a constitutional tort action for racial discrimination brought
267. Jaffee v. United States (.affeel1), 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981), vacating No. 79-1543 (3d
Cir., filed Feb. 20, 1980).
268. Lewis v. United States, 663 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1981) (intentional-tort claim under FTCA
is barred); Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981) (radiation-exposure claim barred
byFeres); Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981) (radiation-exposure claim barred
under FTCA; post-discharge failure to warn might allow recovery); Laswell v. Brown, 524 F.
Supp. 847 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (radiation-exposure suit brought under several theories of action; all
barred); Coffey v. Department of Defense, 518 F. Supp. 726 (D.D.C. 1981) (fifth amendment
claim for exposure to Agent Orange barred by intramilitary immunity).
269. 661 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1981).
[Vol. 60
1982] INTRAMILITARY TORT LAW 537
by Navy enlisted men against their superior officers. The court of appeals
reversed the district court's dismissal of the action. The court of appeals speci-
fied the standard that the district court should use in determining whether such
a complaint could be reviewed. If the decision were reviewable, the military
defendants would generally be entitled only to a qualified immunity. In
Hinkie v. United States270 a Pennsylvania district court held that the Feres
rule did not bar an FTCA action by the wife, son and estate of a serviceman
subjected to nuclear test exposure. The subsequent Jaffee II en banc decision
calls this holding into question.
The growing confusion in the cases reinforces the need for clarification of
the intramilitary immunity doctrine. We may hope that Congress and the
Supreme Court will provide that clarity.
270. 524 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
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denied, 439 U.S. 965 (1978); Stansberry v. Middendorf, 567 F.2d 617 (4th Cir.
1978) (per curiam); Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1977); Martinez
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United States, 394 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1968) (per curiam); Dilworth v. United
States, 387 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1967) (per curiam); Bailey v. DeQuevedo, 375
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F.2d 298 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 948 (1965); Knoch v. United States,
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974 (1957); Thompson v. United States, 493 F. Supp. 28 (W.D. Okla. 1980);
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United States, 451 F. Supp. 918 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Pisciotta v. Ferrando, 428 F.
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Conn. 1979), aff'd mem., 622 F.2d 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 828
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496 (W.D. La. 1957); Rich v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
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(attempt to subdue drunken soldier); Garvas v. Clark Equip. Co., 410 F. Supp.
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